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Abstract
This paper explores relational syllogistic logics, a family of logical systems related to reasoning
about relations in extensions of the classical syllogistic. These are all decidable logical systems. We
prove completeness theorems and complexity results for a natural subfamily of relational syllogistic
logics, parametrized by constructors for terms and for sentences.
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1 Introduction
This paper explores several fragments of relational syllogistic logic and aims to provide completeness and
complexity results for them. These are among the simplest of all logical systems. To set notation and
terminology by example, let us consider the absolutely simplest logical system A, the one for sentences
“all p are q” introduced in [3]. The syntax begins with a setN, called the nouns. Then the sentences of A
are simply the expressions (all p q), where p and q are nouns. The semantics is equally straightforward.
A model M is a set M together with an interpretation function giving a subset [[p]] ⊆M for each noun
p. We then define:
M |= all p q iff [[p]] ⊆ [[q]]. (1)
We employ standard model-theoretic notation and terminology. We say that M satisfies a sentence ϕ,
or that M is a model of ϕ, when M |= ϕ. A theory is a set of sentences. Given a theory Γ, we write
M |= Γ to mean that M satisfies every sentence in Γ; naturally we say that M satisfies Γ, or that M
is a model of Γ. We then have the usual notion of logical consequence: given a theory Γ and a sentence
ϕ, we write Γ |= ϕ if every model of Γ satisfies ϕ.
We match the semantics with a proof system. Our system has two rules of inference, shown below:
all x x
ax
all x y all y z
all x z
barbara
In these rules, the material above the line is the set of premises, and the sentence below is the
conclusion. So (ax) has no premises, and (barbara) has two. A substitution instance of a rule is
obtained by substituting nouns in N for the variables x, y, and z. We can then define the provability
relation Γ ⊢ ϕ: this means that there is a tree whose root is ϕ, and every node in the tree is either a
leaf and belongs to Γ, or else it is the conclusion, and its children are the premises, of a substitution
instance of one of our rules. The soundness/completeness theorem for this system states that Γ |= ϕ iff
Γ ⊢ ϕ. For the proof, see [3].
1.1 Syntax and semantics of the logics in this paper
We are concerned not with A but rather with a family of extensions of it. We start with a set N of
nouns (just as above), and also a set V, the verbs. Then we define terms and sentences via the syntax
below, where p is any noun in N, r is any verb in V, and x and y are any terms:
terms p | r all x | r some x | x
sentences all x y | some x y
(2)
Note that we have recursion here, so terms can be nested, e.g. (r all (s some p)).
For the semantics, we start with a model in our previous sense (to interpret the nouns), and add
interpretations of the verbs as binary relations: [[r]] ⊆M ×M for all r ∈ V. Then we interpret our terms
in a given model by recursion as follows:
[[r all x]] = {m ∈M : for all n ∈ [[x]], m[[r]]n}
[[r some x]] = {m ∈M : there is n ∈ [[x]] such that m[[r]]n}
[[x]] =M \ [[x]]
Thus, the interpretation of every term is a subset of M . We define the truth-relation for sentences and
models by generalizing (1) above:
M |= all x y iff [[x]] ⊆ [[y]]
M |= some x y iff [[x]] ∩ [[y]] 6= ∅
2
language term sentence additions to complexity of the
former(s) former(s) syllogistic logic consequence relation
L1 r all x all x y none PTime
L2 r all x all x y, some x y (cases), or (chains), PTime
or extra syntax
L3 r all x, r some x all x y (cases′) & (cases′2) Co-NPTime complete
L3.5 r all x, r some x all x y, some x y (cases) & (cases2) Co-NPTime complete
L4 r all x, x all x y extra syntax & Co-NPTime hard
schematic rules
L4.5 r all x, x all x y, some x y extra syntax & (raa) ExpTime
& schematic rules
L5 r all x, r some x, x all x y ExpTime complete
L5.5 r all x, r some x, x all x y, some x y individual variables ExpTime complete
Figure 1: Languages in this paper, given by section.
The basic languages in this paper are all sub-languages of the language just presented, which we call
L5.5. And they are all extensions of the language we call L1, which only has the sentence former (all x y)
and the term former (r all x). There are three features in L5.5 which are absent from L1: the sentence
former (some x y), the term former (r some x), and term complementation. We thus explore 23 = 8
logical systems, obtained by all possible combinations of these features. Those languages are listed in
the chart in Figure 1. We organize matters by studying Ln and Ln.5 in Section n. Note that L1 and L2
are related in the same was as Ln and Ln.5 for n > 2, namely by adding the sentence former (some x y).
We are interested in complete proof systems and the complexity of the consequence relation for each
of these languages. By this we mean the computational complexity of the following decision problem:
given a finite theory Γ and a sentence ϕ, output “yes” if Γ |= ϕ and “no” otherwise. Our results, which
are summarized in the last two columns of Figure 1, will be explained in more detail in Section 1.5 below.
1.2 Related work
This paper is similar in spirit to [10], which also considered completeness and complexity results for
decidable languages extending the basic syllogistic logic A. In fact, the largest language of this paper,
L5.5, is essentially equivalent to the largest language considered in [10], called R∗† there (see Proposi-
tions 5.1 and 5.2 below). But there are several differences between the other languages in [10] and in
this paper. First, [10] allowed for complemented verbs, contrary to what we do here. Second, [10] also
explored logical systems where the two terms in sentences like (all x y) were not treated the same. For
example, in two systems there, the subject noun phrase x was required to be (negated) atomic. Third,
we allow nested terms, which are not part of the syntax in [10]. The upshot is that there is no overlap in
the technical results from [10] and this paper, except for the result on L5.5 which we quote in Section 5.
In [2], McAllester and Givan considered a language which is a slight extension of our language L3.5.
In Section 3, we essentially provide a new proof of their result that the consequence relation for this
language is Co-NPTime complete. Our version of this result is slightly sharper, since we prove that the
weaker language L3 is already Co-NPTime hard, and we also provide complete (though non-syllogistic)
proof systems for L3 and L3.5.
We began this paper with A, which was introduced in [3]. But the smallest language in Figure 1 is
L1, which is the extension of A by the term former (r all x). As a proof system for L1, we take the rules
(ax) and (barbara) above (but we allow terms, not just nouns, to be substituted for the variables x,
3
y, and z), together with a new rule:
all x y
all (r all y) (r all x)
anti
It is easy to see that this proof system is sound (if Γ ⊢ ϕ, then Γ |= ϕ). Completeness was shown
in [8], which also contains completeness and complexity results for a number of related languages. The
completeness proof originated in [7], where it is also shown that the consequence relation for L1 is in
PTime. We reprove these results in Section 1.4 below, but using a more general framework described
in Section 1.3. This framework unifies the PTime results for L1 and L2 in Section 2.5, and allows us to
obtain more precise negative results for the other languages in the paper, as we shall see.
1.3 Syllogistic proof systems and bounded completeness
At this point, we wish to formally state what we mean by a syllogistic proof system. To state rules,
we employ a language with noun variables p, q, . . . , verb variables r, s, . . . , term variables x, y, . . . , and
sentence variables ϕ, ψ, . . . . (In practice, none of our rules will make use of noun variables, and very few
will make use of sentence variables.)
A term template is defined as in (2), but using noun and verb variables in place of nouns and verbs,
and with an additional base case: a term variable is a term template. A sentence template is defined as
in (2), but using term templates in place of terms, and with an addition option: a sentence variable is a
sentence template.
A syllogistic rule ρ consists of finitely many (possibly none) sentence templates as premises, and a
single sentence template as a conclusion. A syllogistic proof system is a finite set of syllogistic rules.
We use ⊢ to denote a syllogistic proof system. Given a syllogistic proof system, we also use the
symbol ⊢ for the (standard) provability relation, defined shortly. A substitution instance of a rule ρ is
obtained by substituting nouns, verbs, terms, and sentences for all noun variables, verb variables, term
variables, and sentence variables, respectively. A proof tree over a theory Γ is a tree labeled by sentences,
such that each node is either a leaf and belongs to Γ, or else it is the conclusion, and its children are the
premises, of a substitution instance of one of the rules. We write Γ ⊢ ϕ if there is a proof tree over Γ
whose root is ϕ.
We should mention that a syllogistic proof system is subject to some important limitations. First, the
system cannot include rules which allow for the withdrawal of assumptions, as in reductio ad absurdum,
or proof by cases. (On the other hand, ex falso quodlibet is a syllogistic rule; see [3].) Second, the
premises of each rule must be a fixed finite set of sentence templates; the set of premises cannot be listed
as a schema.
Later in this paper, we shall see proof systems that are not syllogistic in our sense: To obtain
completeness theorems for various logics, we need to add the rule (cases) and its variants (cases2),
(cases′), and (cases′2) in Section 2.3 and Section 3, the rule (raa) in Section 4, and the schema
(chains) in Section 2.4.
Next, we introduce a strengthening of the notion of syllogistic proof system, which ensures that the
consequence relation Γ |= ϕ is efficiently decidable, for any finite theory Γ and any sentence ϕ.
Definition 1.1. Let L be a language, equipped with a syllogistic proof system ⊢, and let A be any set of
sentences in L. We write Γ ⊢A ϕ if Γ ⊢ ϕ via a proof tree T with the property that all sentences in T
belong to A.
Example 1.2. This example is based on the observation that
{all x y, all y z} ⊢ all (r all z) (r all x). (3)
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For example, here is a proof tree:
all y z
all (r all z) (r all y)
anti
all x y
all (r all y) (r all x)
anti
all (r all z) (r all x)
barbara
Let A be the set of all sentences ψ such that every subterm of ψ is in the set {x, y, z, r all x, r all z} (this
is the set of subterms of the sentences appearing in (3)).
Our tree above does not show that
{all x y, all y z} ⊢A all (r all z) (r all x). (4)
The problem is that the term (r all y) is not in A. But the tree below does show (4):
all x y all y z
all x z
barbara
all (r all z) (r all x)
anti
Definition 1.3. A boundedly complete syllogistic proof system for L is a syllogistic proof system ⊢ for
L which is sound, and such that that there exists a PTime-computable f : Pfin(L) → Pfin(L) such that
whenever Γ |= ϕ, then Γ ⊢f(Γ ∪ {ϕ}) ϕ.
Example 1.4. Suppose we are working with the language L1. For any finite set of sentences ∆, let
f(∆) be the set of all sentences ϕ such that every subterm of ϕ is a subterm of a sentence in ∆. Note that
f is computable in polynomial time by enumerating the subterms of sentences in ∆, and then forming
all sentences (all u v) such that u and v are on the list. In connection with Example 1.2, the set A there
is exactly f({all x y, all y z, all (r all z) (r all x)}). In Proposition 1.6 below, we are going to show that
the proof system with rules (ax), (barbara), and (anti) is boundedly complete for L1. The function
f could serve as a witness. But in order to simplify the proof, we use a slightly different function g.
Theorem 1.5. Fix a language L. Let ⊢ be a boundedly complete syllogistic proof system for a language
L. Then ⊢ is complete, and for any finite theory Γ and any sentence ϕ, the problem of deciding whether
Γ |= ϕ is in PTime.
Proof. This is essentially Appendix A of McAllester [1]. Here is a sketch, based on this, and also on a
parallel result in [10] which was proved in the easier setting of syllogistic logics without complex terms.
Let f : Pfin(L) → Pfin(L) be a PTime-computable function such that Γ ⊢f(Γ ∪ {ϕ}) ϕ whenever
Γ |= ϕ. In particular, Γ |= ϕ implies that Γ ⊢ ϕ. So the proof system is complete.
For the PTime decidability, first compute f(Γ∪{ϕ}). Call this set A. Let X0 = Γ∩A. We compute
an increasing sequence of subsets of A by induction. Given Xn, take each of the finitely many rules ρ of
the logic, and do the following: compute the set of all substitution instances of ρ whose premises are all in
Xn; for each such substitution instance, if the conclusion ψ belongs to A, then add ψ to Xn+1. Continue
until the first n∗ such that Xn∗+1 = Xn∗ . Since all the Xn are subsets of A, we have n
∗ ≤ 1 + |A|. And
Γ ⊢A ϕ iff ϕ ∈ Xn∗ . We take it as standard that all of this can be done in PTime.
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1.4 Example: Completeness and PTime decidability for L1
We illustrate the application of Theorem 1.5 to L1 with the syllogistic proof system consisting of the
rules (ax), (barbara), and (anti).
For any set of sentences ∆, let T (∆) be the set of subterms of sentences in ∆. Let T+(∆) be T (∆)
together with the terms (r all w) where w ∈ T (∆) and where r is a verb which appears in ∆.
Let g(∆) be the set of all sentences (all u v), where u ∈ T (∆) and v ∈ T+(∆). Note that when ∆ is
finite, g is computable in PTime.
Proposition 1.6 ([7]). If Γ |= ϕ, then Γ ⊢g(Γ∪{ϕ}) ϕ. Hence the consequence relation for L1 is in
PTime.
Proof. Fix a finite theory Γ and a sentence ϕ. We are going to save on some notation in this proof by
writing T for T (Γ ∪ {ϕ}), T+ for T+(Γ ∪ {ϕ}), and A for g(Γ ∪ {ϕ}).
We make a model M as follows. The domain M of the model is T . The structure of the model is
given by
t ∈ [[p]] iff Γ ⊢A all t p
t[[r]]u iff Γ ⊢A all t (r all u)
(Recall that the set A is fixed as g(Γ ∪ {ϕ}). When we write Γ ⊢A ψ in this proof, we are not changing
the meaning of A to g(Γ ∪ {ψ}).)
Claim 1.7 (Truth Lemma). For all a ∈ T ,
t ∈ [[a]] iff Γ ⊢A all t a. (5)
Proof. The proof is by induction on a. When a is a noun, the assertion in (5) is part of the definition of
the model. Assume (5) for a, and consider (r all a). Since (r all a) ∈ T , then a ∈ T = M as well. Note
also that the sentence (all a a) belongs to A, and so Γ ⊢A all a a by (ax). By induction, a ∈ [[a]].
Let t ∈ [[r all a]]. Since a ∈ [[a]], we have t[[r]]a, and hence Γ ⊢A all t (r all a) by definition of [[r]].
Conversely, assume that Γ ⊢A all t (r all a). Then t ∈ T = M . We show that t ∈ [[r all a]]. For this,
let b ∈ [[a]], so by induction, Γ ⊢A all b a. We must show that t[[r]]b, equivalently Γ ⊢A all t (r all b).
Note that b ∈ M = T , so (r all b) ∈ T+. The key point is that the sentence all (r all a) (r all b)
belongs to A, since (r all a) ∈ T and (r all b) ∈ T+. Using (anti) and Γ ⊢A all b a, we see that
Γ ⊢A all (r all a) (r all b). Then by (barbara), Γ ⊢A all t (r all b).
We continue by showing thatM |= Γ. For this, take any sentence (all u v) in Γ. Let t ∈ [[u]]. By (5),
Γ ⊢A all t u. Now t, u, and v are in T , so the sentences (all u v) and (all t v) are in A. By (barbara),
Γ ⊢A all t v. By (5) again, t ∈ [[v]]. Since t was arbitrary, we have shown that [[u]] ⊆ [[v]], andM |= all u v.
Since M |= Γ and Γ |= ϕ, the sentence ϕ holds in M. Let us write ϕ as (all a b). Then a ∈ T = M
and the sentence (all a a) belongs to A, and so Γ ⊢A all a a by (ax). Thus, a ∈ [[a]] by (5). So a ∈ [[b]].
By (5) again, Γ ⊢A all a b. This concludes the proof.
1.5 Results
Our two main themes are trade-offs between expressive power and computational complexity, and also
the variety of devices that one can add on top of pure syllogistic logic in order to obtain sound and
complete proof systems. Our results are summarized in Figure 1.
We begin with a negative result: L2 has no sound and complete syllogistic proof system. The
argument for this is combinatorial, and in outline it is based on a similar result in [10] forR. Nevertheless,
there are proof systems which capture the consequence relation of L2. Most of Section 2 is devoted to
several such logics, each of which extends syllogistic logic in a different way. One way is to add a rule
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(cases) which enables proof by cases, another uses a schema of rules called (chains) (thus there are
infinitely many rules, but the set of rules is an easily-defined set), and the last is to extend the syntax
in such a way that the extension, called L+2 , does have a sound and complete syllogistic proof system.
In fact, this system is boundedly complete, and by Theorem 1.5, the consequence relation of L+2 , and
hence of its sublanguage L2, is in PTime.
Notice that what we will show is that L2 has no sound and complete syllogistic proof system, but
the larger language L+2 does have such a proof system. The first example of this phenomenon is in [9].
The lower bounds on complexity established in the rest of the paper show that (assuming P 6= NP)
none of the other languages admit boundedly complete syllogistic proof systems.
The languages L3 and L3.5 extend L1 and L2 with the term former (r some x). We show that the
smaller language L3 has a consequence relation which is Co-NPTime hard, via a reduction from the
one-in-three positive 3-SAT problem. On the other hand, a finite countermodel construction shows that
the consequence relation of the larger language L3.5 is in Co-NPTime. It follows that the consequence
relation for both languages are Co-NPTime complete. We give sound and complete proof systems for
these logics which are not syllogistic: they use variants of the rule (cases).
The languages L4 and L4.5 extend L1 and L2 with term complementation. As with L3, we show that
the consequence relation for L4 is Co-NPTime hard, via a reduction from 3-SAT. But this time we leave
open the question of Co-NPTime completeness; the upper bound of ExpTime comes from the known
complexity of the larger language L5.5. We also leave open the problem of formulating proof systems for
L4 and L4.5 in their original syntax. Instead, we present a completeness result for an extension L
+
4.5 of
L4.5. The proof system and the completeness result are comparatively simple, though the proof system
is decidedly non-syllogistic: it includes a form of reductio ad absurdum (raa), as well as several rule
schemas, and the syntax is not even finitary, since there is an infinite family of sentence formers. This
proof system restricts, by dropping (raa), to a sound and complete proof system for the corresponding
extension L+4 of L4.
The largest languages in this paper are L5 and L5.5. We have the least to say about them, mostly
because L5.5 has been studied (in a different but equivalent formulation, called R∗†) in [10], and the
complexity result for it from [10] also holds for L5, as we shall see. The sound and complete proof system
for R∗† from [10] (which is non-syllogistic due to its use of individual variables) can be adapted to a
similar proof system for L5.5, but we do not make that explicit here. We leave open the problem of
formulating a proof system for L5.
One might guess that when we explore a partial order of logics, stronger logics are are harder to
work with and to prove completeness for. But this is not always the case. One reason: as the logics
get stronger, they include more and more features of first-order logic and are thus easier to analyze, due
to our experience with first-order logic. A second reason: sometimes adding to the syntax of a logic
restores harmony in some way, thereby making it easier for us to work with. The examples of L+2 , L
+
4 ,
and L+4.5 emphasize the fact that there is not a monotone relationship between the strength of logical
systems and their elegance, or between their strength and the difficulty of proving completeness. It is
an open problem to develop a general theory which could explain this phenomenon. For example, why
it is that some logical systems have (boundedly complete) syllogistic proof systems (L+2 ), while others
do not (L2)? What have at present are some ad hoc results, and much remains to be done.
2 L2: Adding the sentence former (some x y) to L1
The main results on L2 are (1) it has no finite sound and complete syllogistic proof system; (2) neverthe-
less there are several non-syllogistic devices which allow us to obtain sound and complete proof systems;
(3) alternatively, we can extend the syntax of L2 to a larger language L
+
2 in such a way that L
+
2 has
a boundedly complete syllogistic proof system; and (4) as a result of this last point, the consequence
relation Γ |= ϕ for L+2 (and hence L2) is in PTime.
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2.1 The base system ⊢0
We begin with a proof system in Figure 2 that will be used in this section and beyond.
all x x
ax
all x y all y z
all x z
barbara
all x y
all (r all y) (r all x)
anti
some x y
some x x some1
some x y
some y x some2
some x y all y z
some x z darii
Figure 2: The proof rules of ⊢0
It is easy to check that the rules in Figure 2 are sound. Theorem 2.3 below shows that they are
also complete for conclusions of the form (all x y). Since the rules (ax), (barbara), and (anti) are
complete for L1, this result can be interpreted as saying that L2 is a conservative extension of L1. It is
also possible to give a direct model-theoretic proof of this conservativity result.
In many places in this paper, we will work with a set T of terms. We will always assume that such a
set T is closed under subterms. We could usually take T to be the set of all terms in the language under
study. But when we use T to build a model (as we do just below), that model will be infinite when T is
infinite. Working with a finite set T allows us to build finite models in many situations.
We write Γ ⊢0 ϕ if there is a proof of the sentence ϕ from the theory Γ using the rules in Figure 2.
We also write
x ≤ y
to mean that Γ ⊢0 all x y. We use this notation because ≤ is a preorder, due to (ax) and (barbara).
Please note that Γ is left off of this notation.
The first canonical model of a theory Γ Let Γ be a theory, let T be a set of terms (closed under
subterms as usual), and let M be the set of unordered pairs {t, u} of terms from T. This includes
singletons {t} = {t, t}. We define a model M(Γ,T) with domain M by setting
{t, u} ∈ [[p]] iff t ≤ p or u ≤ p
{t, u}[[r]]{v, w} iff for some a ∈ {t, u} and b ∈ {v, w}, a ≤ r all b
(6)
Lemma 2.1 (Truth Lemma). In M(Γ,T), for all terms x ∈ T,
[[x]] = {{t, u} ∈M : t ≤ x or u ≤ x}.
Proof. By induction on x. For a noun p ∈ N, this is by definition of the model. For a term of the form
(r all x) ∈ T, note that x ∈ T, since T is closed under subterms.
Suppose that {t, u} ∈ [[r all x]]. Since x ≤ x by (ax), the induction hypothesis implies {x} ∈ [[x]]. So
{t, u}[[r]]{x}. By the definition of [[r]], either t ≤ r all x, or else u ≤ r all x.
Conversely, fix {t, u} ∈M , and suppose that (without loss of generality) t ≤ r all x. Let {v, w} ∈M
be an element of [[x]]. By the induction hypothesis, we have (without loss of generality) v ≤ x. By
(anti), r all x ≤ r all v. By (barbara), t ≤ r all v. So {t, u}[[r]]{v, w}, and hence {t, u} ∈ [[r all x]].
Lemma 2.2. If (all x y) ∈ Γ, then M(Γ,T) |= all x y. If x and y are any terms in T, we have
M(Γ,T) |= some x y. As a consequence, if T contains all subterms of sentences in Γ, thenM(Γ,T) |= Γ.
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Proof. Suppose (all x y) ∈ Γ. If {t, u} ∈ [[x]] inM(Γ,T), then by Lemma 2.1 (without loss of generality),
t ≤ x. But then t ≤ y by (barbara), so {t, u} ∈ [[y]] by Lemma 2.1, and M(Γ,T) |= all x y.
Now suppose x, y ∈ T. Since x ≤ x and y ≤ y, we have {x, y} ∈ [[x]] ∩ [[y]] by Lemma 2.1, so
M(Γ,T) |= some x y.
If T contains all subterms of sentences in Γ, then M(Γ,T) |= all x y whenever (all x y) ∈ Γ by the
first assertion, and M(Γ,T) |= some x y whenever (some x y) ∈ Γ by the second assertion.
Theorem 2.3. If Γ |= all x y, then Γ ⊢0 all x y. Moreover, the proof only uses the rules (ax),
(barbara), and (anti).
Proof. Choose T so that it contains x, y, and all terms in Γ. If Γ |= all x y, then M(Γ,T) |= all x y by
Lemma 2.2. Then {x} ∈ [[x]] ⊆ [[y]] by (ax) and Lemma 2.1. By Lemma 2.1 again, Γ ⊢0 all x y.
To see that the proof uses only the rules (ax), (barbara), and (anti), we just need to examine the
rules in the proof system and note that no rule which produces a conclusion of the form (all x y) has a
premise of the form (some a b).
The proof of Theorem 2.3 shows that if Γ 6⊢0 all x y, then there is a countermodel of size O(n2),
where n is the complexity of Γ ∪ {all x y}. However, as noted in Lemma 2.2, M(Γ,T) satisfies every
sentence (some x y) with x, y ∈ T. To obtain a countermodel for sentences of this form, we will look at
a submodel of M(Γ,T).
The second canonical model of a theory Γ Let M ′ be the set of unordered pairs {t, u} of terms
in T such that Γ ⊢0 some t u. Note that we allow t = u. Define a model M′(Γ,T) with domain M ′ just
as in (6).
The proof system ⊢0 is not complete for sentences of the form (some x y), but we can prove a partial
completeness result under the following additional hypothesis on Γ, a form of which was first introduced
by McAllester and Givan [2].
Definition 2.4. We say that Γ determines existentials for T if, for all verbs r ∈ V and all terms
x, y ∈ T, either Γ ⊢0 some x x or Γ ⊢0 all y (r all x).
The intuition behind this definition is that in any model M, for any term x, either M |= some x x,
or [[x]] = ∅, in which case [[r all x]] =M for any verb r, and M |= all y (r all x) for any term y.
Lemma 2.5. Suppose Γ determines existentials for T. Then:
(1) In M′(Γ,T), for all terms x ∈ T, [[x]] = {{t, u} ∈M ′ : t ≤ x or u ≤ x}.
(2) If (all x y) ∈ Γ, then M′(Γ,T) |= all x y.
(3) If x, y ∈ T and (some x y) ∈ Γ, then M′(Γ,T) |= some x y.
As a consequence, if Γ is any theory, T contains all subterms of sentences in Γ, and Γ∗ ⊇ Γ is a theory
which determines existentials for T, then M′(Γ∗,T) |= Γ.
Proof. The proof of (1) is exactly like the proof of Lemma 2.1, with the following adjustment: If {t, u} ∈
[[r all x]] and {x} ∈ M ′, the proof in Lemma 2.1 goes through as written. But if {x} /∈ M ′, then
Γ 6⊢0 some x x, so t ≤ r all x (and also u ≤ r all x), since Γ determines existentials for T.
The proof of (2) is exactly as in the proof of Lemma 2.2.
The proof of (3) is also exactly as in the proof of Lemma 2.2, with the following adjustment: We
need to use the fact that (some x y) ∈ Γ to see that {x, y} ∈M ′.
Putting this together, suppose Γ is any theory, T contains all subterms of sentences in Γ, and Γ∗ ⊇ Γ
determines existentials for T. If (all x y) ∈ Γ ⊆ Γ∗, then M′(Γ∗,T) |= all x y. And if (some x y) ∈ Γ ⊆
Γ∗, then since x, y ∈ T, M′(Γ∗,T) |= some x y.
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Theorem 2.6. Suppose that T contains x, y, and all subterms of sentences in Γ, and Γ∗ ⊇ Γ is a theory
which determines existentials for T. If Γ |= some x y, then Γ∗ ⊢0 some x y.
Proof. Since Γ ⊆ Γ∗,M′(Γ∗,T) |= Γ by Lemma 2.5, soM′(Γ∗,T) |= some x y. Suppose {t, u} ∈ [[x]]∩[[y]].
Since {t, u} ∈ M ′, Γ∗ ⊢0 some t u. And by Lemma 2.5, Γ∗ ⊢0 all v x and Γ∗ ⊢0 all w y for some
v, w ∈ {t, u}. By analyzing the four cases and using (some1), (some2), and (darii), we see that
Γ∗ ⊢0 some x y.
Corollary 2.7. If T contains all subterms of sentences in Γ∪ {ϕ} and Γ determines existentials for T,
then Γ |= ϕ if and only if Γ ⊢0 ϕ.
Proof. The implication Γ ⊢0 ϕ implies Γ |= ϕ is just soundness of the rules in ⊢0. The converse follows
immediately from Theorems 2.3 and 2.6, taking Γ∗ = Γ in Theorem 2.6.
We conclude this section with two proof-theoretic observations about the system ⊢0.
If ~r = r1, . . . , rn is a sequence of verbs and x is a term, we use the notation (~r all x) for the term
(r1 all (r2 all (. . . (rn all x)))). When ~r is the empty sequence, (~r all x) = x.
If ψ = all u v, we define
Anti(~r, ψ) =
{
all (~r all u) (~r all v) if the length of ~r is even
all (~r all v) (~r all u) if the length of ~r is odd.
Note that {ψ} ⊢0 Anti(~r, ψ) by repeated applications of (anti).
Definition 2.8. Let Γ be a theory. A Γ-sequence is a finite sequence of terms t1, . . . , tn, such that for
all 1 ≤ i < n there is a sentence ψ = (all a b) ∈ Γ and a sequence of verbs ~r such that (all ti ti+1) =
Anti(~r, ψi).
Lemma 2.9. Γ ⊢0 all x y if and only if there is a Γ-sequence of terms t1, . . . , tn such that x = t1 and
y = tn.
Proof. Suppose x = t1, . . . , tn = y is a Γ-sequence. If n = 1, then x = y, and Γ ⊢0 all x y by (ax).
If n > 1, then for all 1 ≤ i < n, Γ ⊢0 all ti ti+1 by repeated applications of (anti). And by repeated
applications of (barbara), Γ ⊢0 all x y.
We prove the converse by induction on the height of the proof tree. In the base case, (all x y) ∈ Γ,
and x, y is a Γ-sequence as desired.
Case 1: If the root of the proof tree is
all x x
ax
then x is a Γ-sequence from x to x.
Case 2: If the root of the proof tree is
all x y all y z
all x z
barbara
then by induction we have Γ-sequences t1, . . . , tn and t
′
1, . . . , t
′
m with x = t1, y = tn = t
′
1, and z = t
′
m.
Then t1, . . . , tn−1, t
′
1, . . . , t
′
m is a Γ-sequence from x to z.
Case 3: If the root of the proof tree is
all x y
all (r all y) (r all x)
anti
then by induction we have a Γ-sequence t1, . . . , tn with x = t1 and y = tn. Then (r all tn), . . . , (r all t1)
is a Γ-sequence from (r all y) to (r all x).
Lemma 2.10. Γ ⊢0 some x y if and only if there is a sentence (some t1 t2) ∈ Γ such that Γ ⊢0 all ti x
and Γ ⊢0 all tj y, for some i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. Suppose there is a sentence some t1 t2 ∈ Γ such that Γ ⊢0 all ti x and Γ ⊢0 all tj y, for some
i, j ∈ {1, 2}. Then applying (some1) or (some2) if necessary, Γ ⊢0 some ti tj By two applications of
(darii) and (some2), Γ ⊢0 some x y.
We prove the converse by induction on the height of the proof tree. In the base case, when
(some x y) ∈ Γ, we have Γ ⊢0 all x x and Γ ⊢0 all y y by (ax).
Case 1: If the root of the proof tree is
some x y
some x x some1
then by induction there is a sentence (some t1 t2) ∈ Γ such that Γ ⊢0 all ti x for some i ∈ {1, 2}.
Case 2: If the root of the proof tree is
some x y
some y x some2
then by induction there is a sentence (some t1 t2) ∈ Γ such that Γ ⊢0 all ti y and Γ ⊢0 all tj x, for some
i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
Case 3: If the root of the proof tree is
some x y all y z
some x z darii
then by induction there is a sentence (some t1 t2) ∈ Γ such that Γ ⊢0 all ti x and Γ ⊢0 all tj y, for some
i, j ∈ {1, 2}. But also Γ ⊢0 all y z, so Γ ⊢0 all tj z by (barbara).
2.2 No sound and complete syllogistic proof system for L2
In this section, we prove that there is no sound and complete syllogistic proof system for L2. This
suggests that we need non-syllogistic devices like those which we shall see in coming sections of this
paper. But this talk of rules being “needed” is not precise, and at the end of the day, it is not quite
what we shall prove. At the same time, what we do prove is in a real way stronger than the statement
above. So we need to make all of this precise.
We return to our discussion of syllogistic rules in Section 1.3. Every syllogistic proof system defines
a provability relation between theories and sentences. In this section, we write this relation as Γ ⊢∗ ϕ.
To be sound, we require that if Γ ⊢∗ ϕ, then Γ |= ϕ. To be complete, we require that if Γ |= ϕ, then also
Γ ⊢∗ ϕ.
The degree k consequence relation |=k is the relation between sets Γ and sentences ϕ defined as follows:
Γ |=k ϕ if there is a finite tree with nodes labeled by sentences, such that each node is either a leaf and
in Γ, or else is a sentence ϕ with children ψ1, . . ., ψj for some j ≤ k, and such that {ψ1, . . . , ψj} |= ϕ. If
we have a sound syllogistic proof system ⊢∗, then since it has only finitely many rules, each with finitely
many premises, there is a number k (the maximum number of premises in any rule in ⊢∗) such that
whenever Γ ⊢∗ ϕ, we also have Γ |=k ϕ.
Theorem 2.11. For all n, there is a theory Γn+1 and a sentence ϕ such that Γn+1 |= ϕ, and Γn+1 6|=n ϕ.
As a consequence, there is no sound and complete syllogistic proof system for L2.
Note that the first statement does not refer to proof systems in any way. It is completely semantic.
But it immediately implies the negative result about proof systems.
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The sets Γn For all n, let N = {a, b}, let V = {r1, . . . , rn}, and let Γn be the following theory:
α = some (r1 all (r1 all a)) (r1 all (r1 all a))
ϕ1 = all (r1 all b) (r2 all (r2 all a))
ϕ2 = all (r2 all b) (r3 all (r3 all a))
...
ϕi = all (ri all b) (ri+1 all (ri+1 all a))
...
ϕn−1 = all (rn−1 all b) (rn all (rn all a))
ω = all (rn all b) a
We will use Γn as a recurring example in the forthcoming sections, to demonstrate proof systems.
If r is a verb, then an r-king in a model M is an element x ∈M such that for all y ∈M , x[[r]]y.
Lemma 2.12. Γn |= some a a.
Proof. Let M |= Γn. If [[a]] 6= ∅, we are done. So we shall assume that [[a]] = ∅. Then for any verb r,
[[r all a]] = M . By α, M contains an r1-king x. Then ϕ1 implies that x is also an r2-king. Continuing
by induction, ϕi implies that x is an ri+1-king. Finally, x is an rn-king, and ω implies that x ∈ [[a]],
which is a contradiction.
Lemma 2.13. If Γn |= all u v, then either u = v, or (all u v) = Anti(~r, ψ), for some sequence ~r and
some sentence ψ ∈ Γn.
Proof. By Theorem 2.3, Γn ⊢0 all u v, and by Lemma 2.9, there is a Γn-sequence u = t1, . . . , tm = v of
length m. If m = 1, then u = v and we are done. If m = 2, then (all u v) = Anti(~r, ψ) for some sequence
~r and some ψ ∈ Γn; we are again done.
It remains to prove a contradiction from m ≥ 3. Suppose that we have ψ, θ ∈ Γn and sequences of
verbs ~r and ~s such that (all t1 t2) = Anti(~r, ψ) and (all t2 t3) = Anti(~s, θ). Notice that t2 must contain
either a or b. Assume that t2 contains a. The argument when t2 contains b is similar. Let m be the
the number of verbs in t2, the second term of Anti(~r, ψ). Since it is a rather than b which occurs in the
second term of Anti(~r, ψ), m is even. We see this by examining the sentences in Γn. And let n be the
the number of verbs in t2, the first term of Anti(~s, θ). This time, we see that n is odd. But m = n, since
the second term of Anti(~r, ψ) is the first term of Anti(~s, θ). This is a contradiction.
The sets ∆n,i For all n and all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let the theory ∆n,i be given by
∆n,i =
{
(Γn \ {ϕi}) if 1 ≤ i < n
(Γn \ ω) if i = n
Lemma 2.14. Suppose that for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n and some terms u and v,
∆n,i |= some u v.
Then u = v = (r1 all (r1 all a)), so that (some u v) = α.
Proof. It suffices to show that for every term t 6= (r1 all (r1 all a)), there is a model of ∆n,i in which
[[t]] = ∅. Indeed, then ∆n,i 6|= some u v when u = t or v = t.
We proceed by cases. In every case except t = a, we actually obtain a model of Γn in which [[t]] = ∅.
Since the models M4 of Γn constructed in Case 4 have M4 6|= some a (r1 all (r1 all a)), this implies the
additional result that if Γn |= some u v, then u = v = (r1 all (r1 all a)) or u = v = a.
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Case 1: t = (~s all b) or t = (~s all a), where the length of ~s is odd. Let M1 = {∗}, and define the
model M1 with domain M1 by [[a]] = [[b]] = {∗}, and [[ri]] = ∅ for all i. In M1, we have
[[~s all a]] = [[~s all b]] =
{
{∗} if the length of ~s is even
∅ if the length of ~s is odd,
so M1 |= Γn.
Case 2: t = (~s all b), where the length of ~s is even. Define M2 in the same way as M1, but with
[[b]] = ∅. This time, we have
[[~s all a]] =
{
{∗} if the length of ~s is even
∅ if the length of ~s is odd
[[~s all b]] =
{
∅ if the length of ~s is even
{∗} if the length of ~s is odd,
so again M2 |= Γn.
Case 3: t = a. Fix 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let M3 = {∗}, and define the model M3(i) with domain M3 by
[[a]] = ∅, [[b]] = {∗}, and
[[rj ]] =
{
{(∗, ∗)} for j ≤ i
∅ for j > i
In M3(i), we have
[[rj all a]] = [[b]] = {∗}
[[rj all (rj all a)]] = [[rj all b]] =
{
{∗} if j ≤ i
∅ if j > i,
so M3(i) |= ∆n,i.
Case 4: t = (~s all a), where ~s = (s1, . . . , sk), k is even and nonzero, and ~s 6= (r1, r1). Let M4 =
{w, x, y, z}, and define a model M4 with domain M4 by [[a]] = {w} and [[b]] = {w, x, y, z}. To define the
verb interpretations [[ri]], we break into subcases.
Subcase 4a: sk 6= r1. Set x[[r1]]w, y[[r1]]x, z[[sk]]w, and no other instances of verbs:
z
sk
// w x
r1
oo y
r1
oo
Subcase 4b: sk = r1 and sk−1 6= r1. Set x[[r1]]w, y[[r1]]x, and no other instances of verbs.
z w x
r1
oo y
r1
oo
Subcase 4c: sk = r1, sk−1 = r1, and k > 2. Set x[[r1]]w, y[[r1]]x, z[[sk−2]]y, and no other instances of
verbs.
w x
r1
oo y
r1
oo z
sk−2
oo
In all three subcases, [[r1 all a]] = {x} and [[r1 all (r1 all a)]] = {y}, soM4 |= α. And for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
[[ri all b]] = ∅, so M4 |= Γn. It remains to show that [[~s all a]] = ∅. We introduce some notation: write
~s≥j for the sequence (sj , . . . , sk).
In subcase 4a, [[sk all a]] = {z}, and [[s≥k−1 all a]] = ∅. Since k is even we have
[[~s≥j all a]] =
{
∅ if j is odd
M4 if j is even,
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and [[~s all a]] = [[~s≥1 all a]] = ∅.
In subcase 4b, [[sk all a]] = {x}, and [[s≥k−1 all a]] = ∅. As in subcase 4a, [[~s all a]] = ∅.
In subcase 4c, [[~s≥k−2 all a]] = {z}. So [[~s≥k−3 all a]] = ∅. And then since k is even and k ≥ 4,
[[~s≥1 all a]] = ∅ by the same argument which we have seen above.
This completes the proof.
Lemma 2.15. For any natural number k, and any n ≥ k + 1, if Γn |=k some u v, then u = v =
(r1 all (r1 all a)), so that (some u v) = α.
Proof. By induction on the depth of the tree witnessing Γn |=k some u v. In the base case, (some u v)
is a leaf in Γn. Since α is the only sentence of the form (some u v) in Γn, we are done.
Now suppose the root of the tree is (some u v) with children {ψ1, . . . , ψj}, where j ≤ k, Γn |=k ψi
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ j, and {ψ1, . . . , ψj} |= some u v.
We claim that for all ψi, there is a single sentence χi ∈ Γn such that {χi} |= ψi. By induction, if
ψi has the form (some x y), then ψi = α, and we can take χi = α. On the other hand, if ψi has the
form (all x y), then since Γn |= ψi, by Lemma 2.13 either ψi = (all x x) and we can take χi to be any
sentence in Γn, or ψi = Anti(~ri, χi) for some χi ∈ Γn, and {χi} |= ψi.
By the claim, {χk : k ≤ j} |= some u v. And since j ≤ k ≤ n− 1, there is some 1 ≤ i∗ ≤ n such that
{χk : k ≤ j} ⊆ ∆n,i∗ . For this i
∗, we see that ∆n,i∗ |= ψk for all k ≤ j, so ∆n,i∗ |= some u v. Our result
follows from Lemma 2.14.
Proof of Theorem 2.11. By Lemma 2.12, Γn+1 |= some a a. And by Lemma 2.15, Γn+1 6|=n some a a.
Suppose that ⊢∗ is a sound and complete syllogistic proof system for L2. Let n be the maximum
number of premises in any rule in ⊢∗. Then since Γn+1 |= some a a, we have Γn+1 ⊢∗ some a a by
completeness, and Γn+1 |=n some a a by soundness. This is a contradiction.
We have shown that the full semantic entailment relation |= for L2 is not |=n for any n. This
contrasts with logics like the one for L1; for that, |= coincides with |=2, since there is a sound and
complete syllogistic proof system in which every rule has at most two premises.
Remark Our work in this section used the fact that our set V of verbs can be arbitrarily large. It is
open whether the negative result holds when V is a fixed finite set.
2.3 Completeness using the (cases) rule
We have just seen that L2 has no logical system which is syllogistic, sound, and complete. The rest of
this section rectifies this, in three different ways.
In this section, we add a single rule. It is called (cases), and while it is not syllogistic as we defined
the term in Section 1.3, it is simple and natural. Here is a statement of it.
✭✭
✭✭❤❤❤❤some x x....
ϕ
✭✭
✭✭
✭✭❤❤❤❤❤❤all y (r all x)....
ϕ
ϕ cases (7)
The non-syllogistic feature is that premises are withdrawn in derivations.1 Let us explain how the (cases)
rule is used. To prove ϕ from a set Γ, it is sufficient to take a term x, prove ϕ from Γ∪ {some x x}, and
also prove ϕ from Γ ∪ {all y (r all x)}. Here y can be any term and r can be any verb.
1 The reader might wonder why we are indicating withdrawal of premises using a large “X” rather than the standard
notation of square brackets. The reason is that later in the paper we use square brackets in our syntax, and we will thus
need a different notation later to indicate withdrawals.
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In the logic itself, we take two derivations of ϕ, and then in one we withdraw a sentence (some x x),
while in the other we withdraw a sentence of the form (all y (r all x)) (for this same term x). We may
withdraw zero occurrences or more than one. The overall conclusion is ϕ.
In this subsection, we write ⊢ for provability in the ⊢0 system from Figure 2.1, together with (cases).
Lemma 2.16 (Soundness). If Γ ⊢ ϕ, then Γ |= ϕ.
Proof. By induction on the number n of uses of (cases) in derivations. For n = 0, this is just soundness
of ⊢0. Assume our result for n, and let Γ ⊢ ϕ via a derivation with n + 1 uses of (cases). We may
assume that the last use of (cases) is at the root of the proof tree. So we have
(1) Γ ∪ {some x x} ⊢ ϕ
(2) Γ ∪ {all y (r all x)} ⊢ ϕ
where both derivations have at most n uses of (cases). By our induction hypotheses, (1) and (2) hold
when ⊢ is replaced by |=. Let M |= Γ. Then we have two cases. If [[x]] 6= ∅, then M |= some x x, so
M |= ϕ. And when [[x]] = ∅, we have [[r all x]] = M . So M |= all y (r all x), and thus M |= ϕ.
Example 2.17. Here is a sample derivation.
{some c d, all a x, all a y, all (r all a) x, all (r all a) y} ⊢ some x y.
Let Γ be the theory on the left. We show that
1. Γ ∪ {some a a} ⊢ some x y
2. Γ ∪ {all c (r all a)} ⊢ some x y
The first is easy from (all a x) and (all a y). The second comes from
some c d
some c c some1
all c (r all a) all (r all a) x
all c x
barb
some c x darii
some x c some2
all c (r all a) all (r all a) y
all c y
barb
some x y darii
(Here (barb) abbreviates (barbara).) Note that the premise (all c (r all a)) was used twice.
Example 2.18. We show that Γn ⊢ some a a, where Γn is the theory in Section 2.2.
First, note that ∆ ∪ {some a a} ⊢ some a a for any theory ∆. So by n applications of (cases), to
show that Γn ⊢ some a a, it suffices to show that Γn ∪ {all b (ri all a) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ⊢ some a a. Let Γ
∗
n
be the theory on the left.
Let ψi = all (ri all (ri all a)) (ri all b). By (anti), Γ
∗
n ⊢ ψi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Repeatedly applying
(barbara) to the sequence ψ1, ϕ1, ψ2, ϕ2, . . . , ψn, ω, we find that Γ
∗
n ⊢ all (r1 all (r1 all a)) a. So by α,
(darii), and (some2), Γ
∗
n ⊢ some a a.
Theorem 2.19 (Completeness). If Γ |= ϕ, then Γ ⊢ ϕ.
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Proof. By Theorem 2.3, if Γ |= all x y, then already Γ ⊢0 all x y. So we may assume that ϕ has the
form (some x y). We prove the contrapositive, so assume Γ 6⊢ ϕ. Let T be a set of terms, closed under
subterms, which contains x, y, and all subterms of sentences in Γ. By Zorn’s Lemma2, let Γ∗ ⊇ Γ be a
maximal extension, such that Γ∗ 6⊢ ϕ. The sentences in Γ∗ may contain any terms in the language.
Assume for contradiction that Γ∗ does not determine existentials for T. Then there are terms x, y ∈ T
and a verb r ∈ V such that Γ∗ 6⊢0 some x x and Γ∗ 6⊢0 all y (r all x). In particular, Γ∗ does not contain
either of these sentences. By maximality, we have Γ∗ ∪ {some x x} ⊢ ϕ and Γ∗ ∪ {all y (r all x)} ⊢ ϕ.
By (cases), Γ∗ ⊢ ϕ, contradiction. Thus Γ∗ determines existentials for T.
Now since Γ∗ 6⊢ ϕ, we clearly have Γ∗ 6⊢0 ϕ. So by Theorem 2.6, Γ 6|= ϕ. This is what was to be
shown.
The proofs of Theorem 2.3 and Theorem 2.6 show that if Γ 6⊢ ϕ, then either M(Γ,T) or M′(Γ∗,T)
are countermodels, depending on the form of ϕ. Both of these models have size O(n2), where n is the
complexity of Γ ∪ {ϕ}.
Remark Since ⊢0 is already complete for sentences of the form (all a b), we only need to use (cases)
in proofs of sentences of the form (some a b). Using Lemma 2.10, it is possible to show that (cases) is
equivalent over ⊢0 to the following rule:
all x a all x b
✭✭
✭✭
✭✭❤❤❤❤❤❤all y (r all x)....
some a b
some a b
cases∗
So the system with rules (ax), (barbara), (anti), (some1), (some2), (darii), and (cases
∗) is also
sound and complete for L2. We chose to emphasize (cases) rather than (cases∗) because it made the
completeness proof quicker, and because we will use (cases) again in Section 3.2.
2.4 Completeness using the (chains) schema
In Theorem 2.11, we proved that there are no syllogistic proof systems for L2 which are sound and
complete. We have just seen that L2 has a sound and complete proof system, but one which is not
syllogistic in our sense. In this section, we give another proof system, which this time makes use of a
schema of rules with arbitrarily long (but finite) premise sets.
Definition 2.20. Let a and b be nouns. A chain linking a to b is a sequence C of sentences
C = (all a u1, all v1 u2, . . . , all vi ui+1, . . . , all vm b),
such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, either
1. ui = (~r all zi) and vi = (~r all (r all ti)), where ~r is a sequence of even length, or
2. ui = (~r all (r all ti)) and vi = (~r all zi), where ~r is a sequence of odd length.
We say that this chain has length (m+ 1), and the terms t1, . . . , tm are the missing link terms in C.
Note that a chain of length 1 linking a to b is just the single sentence (all a b) and has no missing
link terms. Here are two chains of length 2 linking a to b:
(all a z, all (r all t) b)
(all a (s all (r all t)), all (s all z) b)
In both of these chains, t is the missing link term.
Returning to the definition, we emphasize that the terms denoted z1, . . . , zm may be arbitrary (they
need not be nouns) and are not missing link terms. The sequence ~r is also arbitrary.
2Of course, we do not actually need the Axiom of Choice when the set of all sentences in the language is countable.
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Lemma 2.21. Suppose C = (all a u1, all v1 u2, . . . , all vm b) is a chain linking a to b, M |= C, and
[[t]] = ∅ for every missing link term t in C. Then [[a]] ⊆ [[b]].
Proof. Since M satisfies all the sentences in C, [[a]] ⊆ [[u1]], [[vm]] ⊆ [[b]], and [[vi]] ⊆ [[ui+1]] for all i. So it
suffices to show that [[ui]] ⊆ [[vi]] for all i.
Let ti be the missing link term for ui and vi. Since [[ti]] = ∅, [[r all ti]] = M. So [[zi]] ⊆ [[r all ti]] for
any term zi. This is the desired inclusion when ~r is the empty sequence. The result then follows by
induction on the length of ~r, using the fact that if [[x]] ⊆ [[y]], then [[r all y]] ⊆ [[r all x]].
Definition 2.22. Let x and y be terms. An (x, y) chain system is a sequence of chains C1, . . . , Cl such
that for every missing link term t in every chain Cn, there exist m,m
′ < n such that Cm links t to x
and Cm′ links t to y. When x = y, we may take m = m
′.
If chains Cm and Cm′ link t to x and y, respectively, we can think of these chains as witnessing
that we are allowed to use t as a missing link term later in the (x, y) chain system. Of course, the first
chain in an (x, y) chain system must have length 1, since there are no available missing link terms from
previous chains.
Lemma 2.23. Let C1, . . . , Cl be an (x, y) chain system. Suppose M |= Ci for all i, and suppose that
[[x]] ∩ [[y]] = ∅ in M. Then [[a]] ⊆ [[b]] whenever some Ci links a to b.
Proof. By induction on l. When l = 0, there are no chains, so the conclusion is vacuously satisfied. Now
suppose C1, . . . , Cl+1 is an (x, y) chain system. By induction, the conclusion holds for the (x, y) chain
system C1, . . . , Cl. So suppose Cl+1 links a to b. For any missing link term t in Cl+1, there are chains
Ci and Cj with i, j ≤ l, linking t to x and t to y. So [[t]] ⊆ [[x]] ∩ [[y]] = ∅. By Lemma 2.21, [[a]] ⊆ [[b]], as
desired.
We introduce the new rule schema
some a b C1 . . . Cl
some x y chains
where C1, . . . , Cl is an (x, y) chain system, some Cm links a to x, and some Cn links b to y.
In this section, we write ⊢ for the proof system ⊢0 augmented by the rule schema (chains).
Theorem 2.24. The (chains) schema is sound.
Proof. Let (some a b), C1, . . . , Cl be the premises of an instance of (chains), and suppose thatM satisfies
these premises. Suppose towards a contradiction that [[x]] ∩ [[y]] = ∅, so Lemma 2.23 applies. Since some
Cm links a to x and some Cn links b to y, we use Lemma 2.23 to see that [[a]] ∩ [[b]] ⊆ [[x]] ∩ [[y]] = ∅. But
this contradicts the assumption that M |= some a b.
Example 2.25. We show that Γn ⊢ some a a, where Γn is the theory in Section 2.2. We will find an
(a, a) chain system which contains a chain linking (r1 all (r1 all a)) to a.
C1 = (all a a) is a chain of length 1 linking a to a. This allows a to be used as a missing link term
in C2. Let β be the sentence
all (r1 all (r1 all a)) (r1 all (r1 all a)).
Then
C2 = (β, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn−1, ω)
is a chain linking (r1 all (r1 all a)) to a, in which the only missing link term is a.
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Let’s check that C2 is a chain. First, u1 = (r1 all (r1 all a)) and v1 = (r1 all c), so this is alternative
2 in Definition 2.20, with t = a, z = c, r = r1, and ~r = r1. All of the rest of the links from ui to vi are
justified in the same way.
Then we have a derivation:
α C1 C2
some a a chains
This shows that Γn ⊢ some a a, because α ∈ Γn, and each sentence in C1, C2 is either β, which is an
instance of (ax), or an element of Γn.
Theorem 2.26 (Completeness). If Γ |= ϕ, then Γ ⊢ ϕ.
Proof. By Theorem 2.3, if Γ |= all x y, then already Γ ⊢0 all x y. So we may assume that ϕ has the
form (some x y). Let T be a set of terms, closed under subterms, which contains x, y, and all subterms
of sentences in Γ.
For any term t ∈ T, let ∆t = {all z (r all t) : z ∈ T, r ∈ V}. In order to extend Γ to a theory which
determines existentials for T, we define an increasing sequence of theories by induction. Set Γ0 = Γ, and
given Γn, define
Γn+1 = Γn ∪ {all z (r all t) : t, z ∈ T, r ∈ V, and Γn ∪ {some t t} ⊢0 ϕ}.
So Γn+1 includes ∆t for all terms t ∈ T such that Γn ∪ {some t t} ⊢0 ϕ. Let Γω =
⋃
n∈ω Γn, and let
Γ∗ = Γω ∪ {some t t : t ∈ T and ∆t 6⊆ Γω}.
Claim 2.27. There is some n such that Γn ⊢0 ϕ.
Proof. Γ∗ determines existentials for T, and by Theorem 2.6, Γ∗ ⊢0 ϕ. By Lemma 2.10, there is a
sentence (some a1 a2) ∈ Γ∗ such that Γ∗ ⊢0 all ai x and Γ∗ ⊢0 all aj y for some i, j ∈ {1, 2}. Since
⊢0-proofs of all-sentences are finite and never contain some-sentences, there is already some n such that
Γn ⊢0 all ai x and Γn ⊢0 all aj y, and we have Γn ∪ {some a1 a2} ⊢0 ϕ.
It remains to show that the sentence (some a1 a2) belongs to Γ ⊆ Γn, since then Γn ⊢0 ϕ. Suppose
not. Then (some a1 a2) is not in Γω, since the sets Γn only add sentences of the form (all z (r all t))
to Γ. So (some a1 a2) is a sentence (some t t) such that ∆t 6⊆ Γω. But then Γn ∪ {some t t} ⊢0 ϕ, so
∆t ⊆ Γn+1 ⊆ Γω, which is a contradiction.
Claim 2.28. If there is some n such that Γn ⊢0 ϕ, then Γ ⊢ ϕ.
Proof. Assume Γ 6⊢ ϕ. Then we will prove the following two claims for all n, by induction:
(1)n For every k ≥ 1 and every Γn-sequence of terms t1, . . . , tk, there is an (x, y) chain system C1, . . . , Cℓ,
such that Cℓ links t1 to tk, and such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ and all ψ ∈ Ci, Γ ⊢ ψ.
(2)n Γn 6⊢0 ϕ.
So assume (1)m and (2)m hold for all m < n. We will first prove (1)n by induction on k.
In the base case, when k = 1, we have t1 = tk, and Γ ⊢ all t1 tk by (ax). The chain (all t1 tk) has
no missing link terms and links t1 to tk. So we have the required (x, y) chain system, consisting of just
this one chain.
Now suppose k > 1, and fix a Γn-sequence t1, . . . , tk. Let C1, . . . , Cℓ be the (x, y) chain system
obtained by induction for the Γn-sequence t1, . . . , tk−1. Then Cℓ links t1 to tk−1, so the last sentence in
Cl is (all c tk−1) for some term c. By the definition of Γn-sequence, there is a sentence all d e ∈ Γn and
a sequence of verbs ~r such that (all tk−1 tk) = Anti(~r, (all d e)).
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If all d e ∈ Γ, then by repeated applications of (anti), Γ ⊢ all tk−1 tk. Since also Γ ⊢ all c tk−1 by
induction, we have Γ ⊢ all c tk by (barbara). Replacing the last sentence of Cℓ with (all c tk), we are
done.
If all d e /∈ Γ, then (all d e) ∈ Γm+1 \ Γm for some 0 ≤ m < n. It follows that e = (r all t) for some
term t such that Γm∪{some t t} ⊢0 ϕ. By Lemma 2.10, there is a sentence (some p q) in Γm∪{some t t}
such that for all w ∈ {x, y} there is some v ∈ {p, q} such that Γm ⊢0 all v w. If some p q ∈ Γm, then
Γm ⊢0 ϕ, contradicting (2)m. Otherwise, the sentence (some p q) must be (some t t). That is, p = q = t,
so Γm ⊢0 all t x and Γm ⊢0 all t y.
By Lemma 2.9, there are Γm-sequences linking t to x and t to y. By (1)m, there are (x, y) chain
systems C′1, . . . , C
′
ℓ′ and C
′′
1 , . . . , C
′′
ℓ′′ such that C
′
ℓ′ links t to x, C
′′
ℓ′′ links t to y, and for every sentence
ψ in every chain, Γ ⊢ ψ. Let C∗ℓ be the chain Cℓ with the sentence (all tk tk) appended. Then C
∗
ℓ
links t1 to tk. We either have tk−1 = (~r all d) and tk = (~r all (r all t)) where ~r has even length, or
tk−1 = (~r all (r all t)) and tk = (~r all d) where ~r has odd length, so the missing link terms in C
∗
ℓ are
those in Cℓ, together with t. Also Γ ⊢ ψ for every sentence ψ in C∗ℓ , by our assumption about Cℓ and
(ax). So C′1, . . . , C
′
ℓ′ , C
′′
1 , . . . , C
′′
ℓ′′ , C1, . . . , Cℓ−1, C
∗
ℓ is our desired (x, y) chain system.
Having established (1)n, we prove (2)n. Assume for contradiction that Γn ⊢0 ϕ. By Lemma 2.10,
there is a sentence (some a1 a2) in Γn such that Γn ⊢0 all ai x and Γn ⊢0 all aj y for some i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
By Lemma 2.10, we thus have Γn-sequences from ai to x and from aj to y. Apply (1)n to these sequences
to obtain (x, y) chain systems C1, . . . , Cℓ and C
′
1, . . . , C
′
ℓ′ such that Cl links ai to x and C
′
ℓ′ links aj to
y, and all sentences in all chains are ⊢-provable from Γ. Then we have an instance of chains
some ai aj C1 . . . Cℓ C
′
1 . . . C
′
ℓ
some x y chains
The sentence (some a1 a2) belongs to Γn, hence to Γ. Applying (some1) or (some2) as needed, Γ ⊢
some ai aj . So this deduction is the root of a proof tree proving (some x y) from Γ.
Claims 2.27 and 2.28 complete the proof of Theorem 2.26.
2.5 Completeness and PTime decidability for the extended language L+2
We have seen that L2 has no sound and complete syllogistic proof system. And we have seen proof
systems which go beyond the “purely syllogistic” in earlier sections. But this section goes in a different
direction. We show that if we enhance the syntax of L2 in a certain way, then we are able to find a
boundedly complete syllogistic proof system for the larger language.
We add to L2 a new four-place sentence former
(all a b) ∨ (some x y)
with the evident semantics
M |= (all a b) ∨ (some x y) iff [[a]] ⊆ [[b]] or [[x]] ∩ [[y]] 6= ∅.
We call the larger language L+2 . Note that we do not allow the disjunction of arbitrary sentences. Rather,
there is a new kind of sentence, which is the disjunction of exactly one sentence (all a b) and one sentence
(some x y). For a proof system, we take the rules in Figure 3, and we write ⊢ for provability in this
system.
Lemma 2.29. The proof system is sound.
Proof. We argue soundness for (empty1), (empty2), and (dd), since soundness of the other rules is
clear from the meaning of disjunction. Fix a model M.
For (empty1), either [[a]] 6= ∅, or ∅ = [[a]] ⊆ [[b]]. In either case, M |= (all a b) ∨ (some a a).
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(all a b) ∨ (some a a)
empty1
(all a b) ∨ (some x y)
(all a b) ∨ (some x x)
some′1
all a b
(all a b) ∨ (some x y)
wl
(all b (r all a)) ∨ (some a a)
empty2
(all a b) ∨ (some x y)
(all a b) ∨ (some y x)
some′2
some x y
(all a b) ∨ (some x y)
wr
(all a b) ∨ (some x y) (all b c) ∨ (some x y)
(all a c) ∨ (some x y)
barb′
(all a b) ∨ (some x y)
(all (r all b) (r all a)) ∨ (some x y)
anti′
some t u (all t x) ∨ (some x y) (all u y) ∨ (some x y)
some x y dd
(all a b) ∨ (some t u) (all t x) ∨ (some x y) (all u y) ∨ (some x y)
(all a b) ∨ (some x y)
dd′
Figure 3: Rules in Section 2.5. These rules are added on top of the rules in Figure 2.
For (empty2), either [[a]] 6= ∅, or [[a]] = ∅. In the latter case, [[b]] ⊆ [[r all a]] = M . In either case,
M |= (all b (r all a)) ∨ (some a a).
For (dd), suppose that M satisfies the premises of the rule, and assume for contradiction that
[[x]] ∩ [[y]] = ∅. Then M |= all t x and M |= all u y. So [[t]] ∩ [[u]] ⊆ [[x]] ∩ [[y]] = ∅, contradicting
M |= some t u.
Example 2.30. The rules (dd) and its companion (dd′) stand for “double darii”. To see the connection
between these rules and (darii), we note that (darii) is redundant in this system:
some x y
all x x
ax
(all x x) ∨ (some x z)
wl
all y z
(all y z) ∨ (some x z)
wl
some x z dd
Note also that (dd) is the only new rule in our proof system which produces a conclusion in the original
syntax of L2. It is responsible, together with (empty2), for the reasoning captured by (cases) and
(chains) in the previous two sections.
Example 2.31. We show that Γn ⊢ some a a, where once again Γn is from Section 2.2. For each
1 ≤ i < n, we have the derivation:
(all b (ri all a)) ∨ (some a a)
empty2
(all (r2i all a) (ri all b)) ∨ (some a a)
anti′
ϕi
(all (ri all b) (r
2
i+1 all a)) ∨ (some a a)
wl
(all (r2i all a) (r
2
i+1 all a)) ∨ (some a a)
barb′
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and similarly, we have:
(all b (rn all a)) ∨ (some a a)
empty2
(all (r2n all a) (rn all b)) ∨ (some a a)
anti′
ω
(all (rn all b) a) ∨ (some a a)
wl
(all (r2n all a) a) ∨ (some a a)
barb′
By n applications of (barb′), we obtain (all (r21 all a) a) ∨ (some a a). And then we conclude:
α (all (r21 all a) a) ∨ (some a a)
some a a dd
Completeness and PTime-decidability At this point, we turn to the completeness and PTime-
decidability of the logic. We are going to apply Theorem 1.5. For any set ∆, let T (∆) be the set of
subterms of sentences in ∆. Let T+(∆) be T (∆) together with the terms (r all w) where w ∈ T (∆) and
where r occurs in ∆.
Let g(∆) be the set consisting of
(i) All sentences (all x y), where x ∈ T (∆) and y ∈ T+(∆)
(ii) All sentences (some u v), where u, v ∈ T (∆).
(iii) All sentences (all x y) ∨ (some u v), where x, u, v ∈ T (∆) and y ∈ T+(∆).
Note that g is computable in PTime.
Theorem 2.32. If Γ |= ϕ, then Γ ⊢g(Γ∪{ϕ}) ϕ. Hence the consequence relation for L
+
2 is in PTime.
Proof. As in Section 1.4, we are going to save on some notation below by writing T for T (Γ∪ {ϕ}), T+
for T+(Γ ∪ {ϕ}), and A for g(Γ ∪ {ϕ}).
We are going to do this entire proof in two parts. The first part handles the case that ϕ is either
(all a b) ∨ (some x y) or else (some x y). After that, we handle the relatively simpler case that ϕ is
(all a b).
So until further notice, we are in the first part of this theorem. Please note that x, y, a, and b are
fixed throughout the rest of this proof.
Let M = Mxy be the set of unordered pairs {t, u} of terms from T such that there is some z ∈ {x, y}
such that for all v ∈ {t, u}, Γ 6⊢A (all v z) ∨ (some x y).
We allow t = u, and it follows that whenever M contains {t, u}, then it also contains {t} = {t, t}.
The point of the definition of M will become clearer after we see the Truth Lemma and Claim 2.35
below: we are building a model which is guaranteed to have [[x]] ∩ [[y]] = ∅.
We define a model M with domain M by setting
{t, u} ∈ [[p]] iff either Γ ⊢A (all t p) ∨ (some x y), or Γ ⊢A (all u p) ∨ (some x y)
{t, u}[[r]]{v, w} iff for some c ∈ {t, u} and d ∈ {v, w}, Γ ⊢A (all c (r all d)) ∨ (some x y).
Claim 2.33 (Truth Lemma). In M,we have the following for all terms z ∈ T ,
[[z]] = {{t, u} ∈M : Γ ⊢A (all t z) ∨ (some x y) or Γ ⊢A (all u z) ∨ (some x y)}.
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Proof. By induction on z. For a noun in N, this is by definition of the model. So we assume our
statement for z and prove it for (r all z) ∈ T . Note that z ∈ T , since T is closed under subterms.
Fix {t, u} ∈M , and suppose (without loss of generality) Γ ⊢A (all t (r all z))∨ (some x y). We show
that {t, u} ∈ [[r all z]]. Let {v, w} ∈ M be an element of [[z]]. By the induction hypothesis, we have
(without loss of generality) Γ ⊢A (all v z) ∨ (some x y). Then by (anti′), Γ ⊢A (all (r all z) (r all v)) ∨
(some x y). Note that the sentence (all (r all z) (r all v)) ∨ (some x y) belongs to A because r all z, x,
and y belong to T and r all v to T+. Moreover, (all t (r all v)) ∨ (some x y) again belongs to A. By
(barb′), Γ ⊢A (all t (r all v)) ∨ (some x y), and hence {t, u}[[r]]{v, w}. So {t, u} ∈ [[r all z]].
Conversely, suppose {t, u} ∈ [[r all z]].
Case 1: {z} ∈M . Notice that Γ ⊢A (all z z)∨(some x y) by (ax) and (wl). By induction, {z} ∈ [[z]].
Hence {t, u}[[r]]{z}. So by the definition of the model, we have either Γ ⊢A (all t (r all z)) ∨ (some x y)
or Γ ⊢A (all u (r all z)) ∨ (some x y), as desired.
Case 2: {z} /∈ M . Then Γ ⊢A (all z x) ∨ (some x y) and Γ ⊢A (all z y) ∨ (some x y). So we have a
proof from Γ:
(all t (r all z)) ∨ (some z z)
empty2
....
(all z x) ∨ (some x y)
....
(all z y) ∨ (some x y)
(all t (r all z)) ∨ (some x y)
dd′
As before, all sentences shown belong to A. We are done. Incidentally, the same argument shows that
also Γ ⊢A (all u (r all z)) ∨ (some x y).
We conclude the first part of our proof of Theorem 2.32 with two claims. Together with the assump-
tion that Γ |= ϕ, they show that Γ ⊢A ϕ, where ϕ is the sentence in the statement of our theorem. In
this part of the proof, recall that ϕ is either (all a b) ∨ (some x y) or (some x y).
Claim 2.34. Either Γ ⊢A ϕ, or M |= Γ.
Proof. Let ψ be a sentence in Γ. We check that either Γ ⊢A ϕ, or M |= ψ.
Case 1: ψ is (all c d). By (wl), Γ ⊢A (all c d) ∨ (some x y). For any {t, u} ∈ [[c]], by the Truth
Lemma (without loss of generality) Γ ⊢A (all t c) ∨ (some x y). By (barb′), Γ ⊢A (all t d) ∨ (some x y).
So {t, u} ∈ [[d]] by the Truth Lemma again. So in this case, we have M |= ψ.
Case 2: ψ is (some c d). There are two subcases, depending on whether or not {c, d} belongs to M .
If it does, then {c, d} ∈ [[c]]∩ [[d]], soM |= ψ. So we assume that {c, d} /∈M . Then there are e, f ∈ {c, d}
such that Γ ⊢A (all e x) ∨ (some x y) and Γ ⊢A (all f y) ∨ (some x y). Applying (some1) and (some2)
as needed, Γ ⊢A some e f . Then by (dd), Γ ⊢A some x y. If ϕ is (some x y), then we are immediately
done. And if ϕ is (all a b) ∨ (some x y), then we are done after applying (wr).
Case 3: ψ is (all s t) ∨ (some c d). This is a combination of the two previous arguments.
Again there are two subcases, depending on whether or not {c, d} belongs to M . If it does, then
{c, d} ∈ [[c]] ∩ [[d]], so M |= ψ. So we assume that {c, d} /∈ M . Then there are e, f ∈ {c, d} such that
Γ ⊢A (all e x) ∨ (some x y) and Γ ⊢A (all f y) ∨ (some x y). Applying (some′1) and (some
′
2) as needed,
Γ ⊢A (all s t)∨(some e f). Then by (dd′), Γ ⊢A (all s t)∨(some x y). For any {u, v} ∈ [[s]], by the Truth
Lemma (without loss of generality) Γ ⊢A (all u s)∨ (some x y). By (barb
′), Γ ⊢A (all u t)∨ (some x y).
So {u, v} ∈ [[t]] by the Truth Lemma again. So we have M |= all s t, and M |= ψ.
Claim 2.35. If M |= ϕ, then Γ ⊢A ϕ.
Proof. Case 1: ϕ is (some x y). In this case, we claim that M 6|= ϕ. The reason is that by the Truth
Lemma and the definition of M ,
{t, u} ∈M iff {t, u} /∈ [[x]] ∩ [[y]].
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Case 2: ϕ is (all a b) ∨ (some x y). By Case 1, we assume that M |= all a b. Consider {a}. If
{a} /∈M , then Γ ⊢A (all a x) ∨ (some x y) and Γ ⊢A (all a y) ∨ (some x y). Then we have the following
proof of ϕ from Γ:
(all a b) ∨ (some a a)
empty1
....
(all a x) ∨ (some x y)
....
(all a y) ∨ (some x y)
(all a b) ∨ (some x y)
dd′
All sentences shown belong to A. So we have the desired conclusion Γ ⊢A ϕ. On the other hand, if
{a} ∈ M , then since {a} ∈ [[a]] and M |= all a b, we have {a} ∈ [[b]]. By the Truth Lemma, we again
have Γ ⊢A (all a b) ∨ (some x y).
This concludes the first part of the proof of Theorem 2.32. The second part is when ϕ is a sentence
(all c d). In this part, we repeat the construction and proof above, with the following adjustments:
1. We let M be the set of all unordered pairs of terms from T , with no restriction.
2. We drop the disjunct ∨(some x y) from all sentences which appear in the proof, including the
definition of M and the statement of the Truth Lemma.
3. In the proof of the Truth Lemma, Case 2 does not occur, since {z} ∈M .
4. In the proof of Claim 2.34, the subcases where {c, d} /∈M do not occur.
5. We replace the proof of Claim 2.35 with the following argument. Recall that ϕ is (all c d). We
assume that [[c]] ⊆ [[d]], and we need to show that Γ ⊢A all c d. By the Truth Lemma, {c} ∈ [[c]].
Thus, {c} ∈ [[d]]. By the Truth Lemma again, Γ ⊢A all c d.
3 L3 and L3.5: Adding the term former (r some x) to L1 and L2
In this section, we study L3, the language with term formers (r all x) and (r some x), and with sentence
former (all x y). We also study the larger language L3.5 which adds the sentence former (some x y).
The language L3.5 has essentially already been studied by McAllester and Givan in [2], but that paper
is primarily concerned with complexity results rather than completeness results. What McAllester and
Givan would call a quantifier-free atomic formula without constants is exactly what we call a sentence
of L3.5. What they would call a quantifier-free literal without constants is either an L3.5 sentence ϕ
or its negation ¬ϕ. They show that the satisfiability problem for sets Γ of literals which determine
existentials is in PTime. And from this, they derive that the satisfiability problem for sets Γ of literals
(which perhaps do not determine existentials) of literals is in NPTime. Thus, their result implies that
the consequence relation for L3.5 is in Co-NPTime. They prove a matching hardness result as well, and
so the consequence relation for L3.5 is Co-NPTime complete.
We show that the consequence relation for L3 is Co-NPTime hard. Our proof is based on the one
in [2], and the result here is a slight improvement on [2] because L3 is a little weaker than their language.
As a corollary, if P 6= NP, then there is no boundedly complete syllogistic proof system for L3 or any
language larger than it.
In Sections 3.3 and 3.2 we formulate proof systems and obtain completeness results for L3 and L3.5.
We also reprove the Co-NPTime decidability of L3.5 by a polynomial-size countermodel construction.
3.1 Co-NPTime hardness of the consequence relation of L3
Theorem 3.1. The problem of deciding whether Γ 6|= ϕ, for Γ ∪ {ϕ} a finite set of L3-sentences, is
NPTime hard.
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Proof. We use a reduction from the one-in-three positive 3-SAT problem first studied by Schaefer [11].
This problem is defined as follows. We are given a set S of clauses of the form U ∨ V ∨W , where U , V ,
and W are distinct. (Note that negation is not used.) The problem is to find a truth assignment f to
the variables making exactly one variable in each clause T and the other two variables F. We call this a
1-valued assignment for S. This problem was shown to be NPTime complete in Schaefer [11].
We define a set Γ = Γ(S) below, in two steps. We use nouns which correspond to the variables of S,
writing u for the noun corresponding with U , etc. Γ also uses a number of other nouns and verbs. It is
defined as follows:
(1) For each clause c ∈ S, say c = U ∨ V ∨W , put the following sentences in Γ:
all start (r1c all u) all (r
1
c some u) yc
all yc (r
2
c all v) all (r
2
c some v) zc
all zc (r
3
c all w) all (r
3
c some w) finish
Here start and finish are new nouns (not varying with the clause), yc and zc are also new nouns
(these do vary with c), and r12 , r
2
c , and r
3
c are new verbs.
(2) Let P and Q be any two distinct variables which occur together in some clause c. Then add to Γ
the sentence ϕp,q:
all (rp,q all p) (r
′
p,q some q).
Here rp,q and r
′
p,q are new verbs. (By symmetry, we also add ϕq,p.)
So if S has k clauses, then the first point will add 2 + 2k new nouns and 3k new verbs. The second
clause will add at most 2 ·
(
3k
2
)
< 18k2 new verbs.
Claim 3.2. S has a 1-valued assignment iff Γ 6|= all start finish.
Proof. In one direction, assume that M |= Γ and M 6|= all start finish. Define a truth assignment f by
f(U) = F iff [[u]] 6= ∅. Consider a clause c = U ∨ V ∨W of S. If f(U) = f(V ) = f(W ) = F, then [[u]],
[[v]], and [[w]] are all non-empty. By the sentences in (1),
[[start]] ⊆ [[yc]] ⊆ [[zc]] ⊆ [[finish]].
But this contradicts thatM 6|= all start finish. Thus we know that at least one variable in c is assigned the
value T by f . We claim that only one variable can be T. For suppose towards a contradiction that (for
example) U 6= V but f(U) = f(V ) = T. Then [[u]] = [[v]] = ∅. So [[rp,q all u]] = M and [[r′p,q some v]] = ∅.
By the sentence ϕp,q in point (2), M is empty. But this is impossible, since M 6|= all start finish.
Conversely, suppose f is 1-valued on S. We must find a modelM |= Γ whereM 6|= all start finish. Let
M be the set of variables U such that f(U) = F, together with start and finish. For a variable X , define
[[x]] = ∅ if f(X) = T, and [[x]] = {x} if f(X) = F. We also take [[start]] = {start}, and [[finish]] = {finish}.
We still need to define [[yc]], [[zc]], [[r
1
c ]], [[r
2
c ]], [[r
2
c ]] for all clauses c, and also [[rp,q]] and [[r
′
p,q]] when P
and Q are distinct variables in the same clause.
Suppose that P and Q are distinct variables which happen to belong to the same clause. We must
arrange thatM |= ϕp,q. Set [[rp,q]] = ∅ and [[r′p,q]] =M ×M . We know that either f(P ) = F or f(Q) = F
(or both). In the first case, [[rp,q all p]] = ∅, so M |= ϕp,q. In the second case, [[r′p,q some q]] = M so
again M |= ϕp,q.
Finally, we consider the sentences in (1). There are three cases.
If f(U) = T, f(V ) = F, and f(W ) = F, then we have [[u]] = ∅, [[v]] = {v}, and [[w]] = {w}. We set
[[yc]] = ∅, [[zc]] = ∅, [[r1c ]] =M ×M , [[r
2
c ]] = ∅, and [[r
3
c ]] = ∅.
If f(U) = F, f(V ) = T, and f(W ) = F, we have [[u]] = {u}, [[v]] = ∅, and [[w]] = {w}. We set
[[yc]] = M , [[zc]] = ∅, [[r1c ]] =M ×M , [[r
2
c ]] = ∅, and [[r
3
c ]] = ∅.
If f(U) = F, f(V ) = F, and f(W ) = T, we have [[u]] = {u}, [[v]] = {v}, and [[w]] = ∅. We set [[yc]] =M ,
[[zc]] = M , [[r
1
c ]] =M ×M , [[r
2
c ]] = M ×M , and [[r
3
c ]] = ∅.
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In all cases, the resulting model M satisfies all sentences in (1), hence all sentences in Γ. And in all
cases, M 6|= all start finish.
The claim concludes the proof Theorem 3.1.
3.2 Completeness and Co-NPTime decidability for L3.5
We first present a sound and complete proof system for L3.5, because it is actually a bit simpler than
L3, and mirrors more closely our work from Section 2. The rules are in Figure 4. We return to L3 in
Section 3.3 below.
Since the consequence relations for L3 and L3.5 are Co-NPTime hard, by Theorem 1.5 we cannot
hope for a boundedly complete syllogistic proof system for these languages (unless P=NP). We regard
it as unlikely that they admit any sound and complete complete syllogistic proof system. Instead, we
settle for a proof system with (cases) from Section 2.3, as well as a variant, (cases2). Figure 4 gives
proof rules for this logic.
all x y
all (r some x) (r some y)
mono
some x y
all (r all x) (r some y)
sa
some x (r some y)
some y y ss
✭✭
✭✭❤❤❤❤some x x....
ϕ
✭✭
✭✭
✭✭❤❤❤❤❤❤all y (r all x)....
ϕ
ϕ cases
✭✭
✭✭❤❤❤❤some x x....
ϕ
✘✘
✘❳❳❳all x y....
ϕ
ϕ cases2
Figure 4: The logic of Section 3.2. We also use the rules in Figure 2.
In this section, we write ⊢ for provability in the system with rules (ax), (barbara), (anti), (some1),
(some2), (darii), (mono), (sa), (ss), (cases), and (cases2). Given a theory Γ, we write x ≤ y when
Γ ⊢ all x y. We say that Γ determines existentials for a set of terms T if for every x ∈ T, either
Γ ⊢ some x x, or else Γ ⊢ all x y and Γ ⊢ all y (r all x) for all terms y ∈ T and all verbs r.
The canonical model Let Γ be a theory, and let T be a set of terms, closed under subterms as usual.
Define
M = {〈x, y,Q〉 ∈ T× T× {∀, ∃} : Γ ⊢ some x y}.
We define a model M(Γ,T) with domain M by setting
〈x, y,Q〉 ∈ [[p]] iff x ≤ p or y ≤ p
〈x1, y1, Q1〉[[r]]〈x2, y2, Q2〉 iff for some z1 ∈ {x1, y1} and z2 ∈ {x2, y2}, either
(a) z1 ≤ (r all z2), or
(b) Q2 = ∃, x2 = y2, and z1 ≤ (r some z2).
Lemma 3.3 (Truth Lemma). If Γ determines existentials for T, then in M′(Γ,T), for all t ∈ T,
[[t]] = {〈x, y,Q〉 ∈M : x ≤ p or y ≤ p}. (8)
Proof. The proof is by induction on t. For a noun p, this is by definition of the model.
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The induction step for (r all t) Since T is closed under subterms, t ∈ T. Take some 〈c1, c2, Q〉
such that ci ≤ (r all t) for some i ∈ {1, 2}. We show that 〈c1, c2, Q〉 ∈ [[r all t]]. For this, suppose
〈d1, d2, Q′〉 ∈ [[t]]. By induction hypothesis, dj ≤ t for some j ∈ {1, 2}. Using (anti), (r all t) ≤ (r all dj),
so ci ≤ (r all dj). Thus, 〈c1, c2, Q〉[[r]]〈d1, d2, Q
′〉. Since 〈d1, d2, Q
′〉 was arbitrary, we have shown that
〈c1, c2, Q〉 ∈ [[r all t]], as desired.
In the other direction, suppose that 〈c1, c2, Q〉 ∈ [[r all t]]. If Γ ⊢ some t t, then 〈t, t, ∀〉 ∈ M . By
induction, since t ≤ t, 〈t, t, ∀〉 ∈ [[t]], so 〈c1, c2, Q〉[[r]]〈t, t, ∀〉. Since the last component in 〈t, t, ∀〉 is ∀
rather than ∃, case (a) in the definition of [[r]] holds, and ci ≤ (r all t) for some i ∈ {1, 2}.
It remains to consider the case when Γ 6⊢ some t t. But since Γ determines existentials, Γ ⊢
all y (r all t) for all terms y, and in particular c1 ≤ (r all t).
The induction step for (r some t) Again, since T is closed under subterms, t ∈ T. Take some
〈c1, c2, Q〉 such that ci ≤ (r some t). The fact that 〈c1, c2, Q〉 ∈ M implies that Γ ⊢ some c1 c2. By
(some2) and (some1), Γ ⊢ some ci ci, and by (darii), Γ ⊢ some ci (r some t). But then by (ss),
Γ ⊢ some t t, and hence 〈t, t, ∃〉 ∈ M . By case (b) in the definition of [[r]], 〈c1, c2, Q〉[[r]]〈t, t, ∃〉. By
induction 〈t, t, ∃〉 ∈ [[t]], so 〈c1, c2, Q〉 ∈ [[r some t]].
In the other direction, suppose that 〈c1, c2, Q〉 ∈ [[r some t]]. Then we have 〈c1, c2, Q〉[[r]]〈d1, d2, Q′〉
for some 〈d1, d2, Q′〉 ∈ [[t]]. Since 〈d1, d2, Q′〉 ∈M , Γ ⊢ some d1 d2. And also dk ≤ t for some k ∈ {1, 2},
by induction.
We first consider case (a) in the definition of [[r]]: there are i and j so that ci ≤ (r all dj). From
Γ ⊢ some d1 d2 and dk ≤ t, using (darii), (some1), and (some2), Γ ⊢ some dj t. By (sa), (r all dj) ≤
(r some t), so by (barbara), ci ≤ (r some t).
In case (b), Q′ = ∃, d1 = d2, and for some i, ci ≤ (r some d1). By (mono), (r some d1) ≤ (r some t),
so ci ≤ (r some t).
Lemma 3.4. Suppose that T contains all subterms of sentences in Γ and Γ∗ ⊇ Γ is a theory which
determines existentials for T. Then M(Γ∗,T) |= Γ.
Proof. For a sentence (all x y) ∈ Γ, we have Γ∗ ⊢ all x y. We are going to apply Lemma 3.3 toM(Γ∗,T)
(that is, the ≤ symbol here is for provability in Γ∗). If 〈c1, c2, Q〉 ∈ [[x]] in M(Γ∗,T), then ci ≤ x for
some i ∈ {1, 2}. But then also ci ≤ y, so 〈c1, c2, Q〉 ∈ [[y]].
For a sentence (some x y) ∈ Γ, we have Γ∗ ⊢ some x y, so 〈x, y, ∀〉 ∈M . And 〈x, y, ∀〉 ∈ [[x]] ∩ [[y]] in
M(Γ∗,T).
Theorem 3.5. Γ |= ϕ iff Γ ⊢ ϕ.
Proof. The soundness is easy, with soundness of (cases2) following just as in the proof of Lemma 2.16.
The argument for completeness is the same as we saw in the proof of Theorem 2.19. Let T be the set
of all subterms of sentences in Γ ∪ {ϕ}. We assume that Γ 6⊢ ϕ and show that Γ 6|= ϕ. We may pass to
a maximal extension Γ∗ ⊇ Γ with the property that Γ∗ 6⊢ ϕ. It follows from (cases) and (cases2) that
Γ∗ determines existentials for T, just as in the proof of Theorem 2.19. By Lemma 3.4, M(Γ∗,T) |= Γ.
We claim that ϕ is false in this model.
Case 1: ϕ is (all x y). Since Γ∗ determines existentials for T and Γ∗ 6⊢ all x y, we have Γ∗ ⊢ some x x.
So 〈x, x, ∀〉 ∈M . By Lemma 3.4, 〈x, x, ∀〉 ∈ [[x]] \ [[y]], since x ≤ x but x 6≤ y.
Case 2: ϕ is (some x y). Suppose towards a contradiction that M(Γ∗,T) |= ϕ. Specifically, let
〈d1, d2, Q〉 ∈ [[x]] ∩ [[y]]. Then Γ
∗ ⊢ some d1 d2, and also there are i and j such that di ≤ x and dj ≤ y.
Using (some1), (some2), and (darii), Γ
∗ ⊢ some x y.
The proof shows that if Γ 6⊢ ϕ, then there is a countermodel of size O(n2), where n is the complexity
of Γ ∪ {ϕ}. Since M |= Γ and M 6|= ϕ can be checked in time polynomial in the size of M and the
complexity of Γ ∪ {ϕ}, this shows that the consequence relation for L3.5 is in Co-NPTime.
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3.3 Completeness for L3
In L3, we do not have the sentence former (some x y), which was used in the previous section to formulate
the condition that Γ determines existentials. Nevertheless, we are able to follow the same strategy as for
L3.5 to prove a completeness theorem. The key observation is that for a term x and a nonempty model
M, [[x]] 6= ∅ in M if and only if M |= all (r all x) (r some x) for every verb r. We use the collection of
all sentences of this form as a replacement for (some x x).
Figure 5 gives our proof system for this logic. The soundness of (mono) is immediate. For (mix),
note that if N |= all (r all y) (r some y), then either N = ∅, or [[y]] 6= ∅. If N = ∅, the conclusion of the
rule holds. And if [[y]] 6= ∅ and N |= all y (r some x), then [[x]] 6= ∅ also. Again, the conclusion of the rule
follows. The soundness of the (cases) variants follow as in Lemma 2.16, using the above observation
about sentences of the form all (r all y) (r some y).
Note that in (mix), the verb s appearing in the conclusion may be different than the verb r ap-
pearing in the premises. And in (cases′), the withdrawn premises are (all (r all x) (r some x)) and
(all y (s all x)), where the verbs r and s may be different.
As usual, we write ⊢ for provability in this system, and given a theory Γ, we write x ≤ y when
Γ ⊢ all x y.
all x y
all (r some x) (r some y)
mono
all (r all y) (r some y) all y (r some x)
all (s all x) (s some x)
mix
✭✭
✭✭
✭✭
✭✭
✭✭❤❤❤❤❤❤❤❤❤❤
all (r all x) (r some x)
....
ϕ
✭✭
✭✭
✭✭❤❤❤❤❤❤all y (s all x)....
ϕ
ϕ cases
′
✭✭
✭✭
✭✭
✭✭
✭✭❤❤❤❤❤❤❤❤❤❤
all (r all x) (r some x)
....
ϕ
✘✘
✘❳❳❳all x y....
ϕ
ϕ cases
′
2
Figure 5: The logic of Section 3.3. We also use (ax), (barbara), (anti) from Figure 2.
Definition 3.6. Let Γ be a theory and T a set of terms. A term x ∈ T is effectively non-empty (for
Γ) if for all verbs r, Γ ⊢ all (r all x) (r some x). And x is effectively empty (for Γ) if for all y ∈ T,
Γ ⊢ all x y and Γ ⊢ all y (r all x) for all verbs r.
Γ effectively determines existentials for T if every x ∈ T is either effectively empty or effectively
non-empty for Γ.
The canonical model Let Γ be a theory, and let T be a set of terms. Define
M = {〈x,Q〉 ∈ T× {∀, ∃} : x is effectively non-empty for Γ}
We define a model M(Γ,T) with domain M by setting
〈x,Q〉 ∈ [[p]] iff x ≤ p
〈x,Q〉[[r]]〈y,Q′〉 iff either (a) x ≤ (r all y),
or (b) Q′ = ∃, and x ≤ (r some y).
Lemma 3.7 (Truth Lemma). Assume that Γ effectively determines existentials for T. Then for all
x ∈ T,
[[x]] = {〈y,Q〉 ∈M : y ≤ x}.
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Proof. By induction on x. When x is a noun, this follows immediately from the definition.
Here is the induction step for (r all x). Suppose that 〈y,Q〉 ∈ [[r all x]]. If x is effectively empty,
then y ≤ (r all x), and so we are done. If x is effectively non-empty, then 〈x, ∀〉 ∈ M . Since x ≤ x, by
induction 〈x, ∀〉 ∈ [[X ]], and 〈y,Q〉[[r]]〈x, ∀〉. Then case (a) holds and again y ≤ (r all x).
In the other direction, suppose that y ≤ (r all x). We show that for any 〈y,Q〉 ∈M , 〈y,Q〉[[r]]〈z,Q′〉
for all 〈z,Q′〉 ∈ [[x]]. By induction, z ≤ x. Using (anti), (r all x) ≤ (r all z). Thus, y ≤ (r all z), and so
indeed 〈y,Q〉[[r]]〈z,Q′〉.
Finally, we have the induction step for (r some x). Suppose that 〈y,Q〉 ∈ [[r some x]]. Then there is
some 〈z,Q′〉 ∈ [[x]] such that 〈y,Q〉[[r]]〈z,Q′〉. So z is effectively non-empty, and by induction z ≤ x.
Case 1: Q′ = ∃. Then y ≤ (r some z). By (mono), (r some z) ≤ (r some x), so also y ≤ (r some x),
as was to be shown.
Case 2: Q′ = ∀. Then y ≤ (r all x). By (anti), (r all x) ≤ (r all z), so y ≤ (r all z). The fact
that z is effectively non-empty means that (r all z) ≤ (r some z). And by (mono), as observed above,
(r some z) ≤ (r some x). So again we have y ≤ (r some x).
In the other direction, let y ∈ T be such that y ≤ (r some x). Suppose that 〈y,Q〉 ∈ M . Then y is
effectively non-empty. In particular, (r all y) ≤ (r some y), and by (mix), for every verb s, (s all x) ≤
(s some x), so x is effectively non-empty. Then 〈x, ∃〉 ∈M . By case (b), 〈y,Q〉[[r]]〈x, ∃〉, and by induction
〈x, ∃〉 ∈ [[x]], so 〈y,Q〉 ∈ [[r some x]].
Lemma 3.8. Suppose T contains all subterms of sentences in Γ and Γ∗ ⊇ Γ is a theory which effectively
determines existentials for T. Then M(Γ∗,T) |= Γ.
Proof. For a sentence (all x y) ∈ Γ, we have Γ∗ ⊢ all x y, so x ≤ y. If 〈z,Q〉 ∈ [[x]] in M(Γ∗,T), then
z ≤ x. But then also z ≤ y, so 〈z,Q〉 ∈ [[y]].
Theorem 3.9. Γ |= ϕ iff Γ ⊢ ϕ.
Proof. We discussed the soundness when we introduced the rules.
For completeness, let T be the set of all subterms of sentences in Γ ∪ {ϕ}. We assume that Γ 6⊢ ϕ
and show that Γ 6|= ϕ. We may pass to a maximal extension Γ∗ ⊇ Γ with the property that Γ∗ 6⊢ ϕ. It
follows from (cases′) and (cases′2) that Γ
∗ effectively determines existentials for T, just as in the proof
of Theorem 2.19. By Lemma 3.8, M(Γ∗,T) |= Γ.
We claim that ϕ is false in this model. Write ϕ as (all x y). Since Γ∗ effectively determines existentials
for T and Γ∗ 6⊢ all x y, x is effectively nonempty for Γ∗. So 〈x, ∀〉 ∈M . By Lemma 3.7, 〈x, ∀〉 ∈ [[x]]\ [[y]],
since x ≤ x but x 6≤ y.
The proof shows that if Γ 6⊢ ϕ, then there is a countermodel of size O(n), where n is the complexity
of Γ ∪ {ϕ}.
4 L4 and L4.5: Adding term complementation to L1 and L2
This section extends L1 and L2 by adding term complements. That is, we extend the syntax of L so
that whenever t is a term, t is a term, and we extend the semantics so that in a model M, [[t]] =M\ [[t]].
If we add term complements to L1, we get L4, and if we add term complements to L2, we get L4.5.
4.1 Co-NPTime hardness of the consequence relation of L4
We begin with a negative complexity-theoretic result, reducing 3-SAT to the relation Γ 6|= ϕ in L4.
Let BV = {Pi : i ∈ N} be a set of boolean variables. Suppose we have an instance of 3-SAT,
c1 ∧ · · · ∧ ck, where each clause ci has the form Ui ∨ Vi ∨Wi, where Ui, Vi and Wi are literals: variables
in BV or their negations.
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Then we consider the language with nouns
{p : P ∈ BV } ∪ {q} ∪ {yi, zi : 1 ≤ i ≤ k}
and verbs {ri : 1 ≤ i ≤ k}. Notice that we write p for the noun corresponding to the variable P . We
will also write u for the literal U , where if U is a variable P , then u is the noun p, and if U is a negated
variable ¬P , then u is the term p.
For each clause ci = Ui ∨ Vi ∨Wi, we define the following sentences:
ψi1 = all ui (ri all yi)
ψi2 = all vi (ri all yi)
ψi3 = all (ri all zi) wi
And we define
Γ = {ψi1, ψ
i
2, ψ
i
3 : 1 ≤ i ≤ k}
ϕ = all q q
Lemma 4.1. Γ 6|= ϕ if and only if Γ has a nonempty model.
Proof. Suppose Γ has a model M with nonempty domain M . Let M′ be a model with domain M and
the same interpretations of all of the nouns and verbs, except for q, which we interpret as all ofM . Since
the sentences in Γ do not mention q, we still have M′ |= Γ. And for any x ∈ M , we have x ∈ [[q]] = M
and x /∈ [[q]] = ∅, so Γ 6|= ϕ. Conversely, suppose every model of Γ is empty. Then in any model M of Γ,
we have [[q]] = ∅ ⊆ [[q]] = ∅, so Γ |= ϕ.
Theorem 4.2. Γ 6|= ϕ if and only if c1 ∧ · · · ∧ ck is satisfiable.
Proof. Suppose Γ 6|= ϕ. By Lemma 4.1, Γ has a model M with nonempty domain M . Let x ∈ M .
Define a truth assignment f for the proposition letters, by
f(P ) =
{
T if x ∈ [[p]]
F if x /∈ [[p]].
The truth assignment extends to literals in the natural way: f(¬P ) = T if f(P ) = F, and f(¬P ) = F
if f(P ) = T. Note that if U is a literal with corresponding term u, then we have x ∈ [[u]] if and only if
f(U) = T.
We check that each clause ci = Ui∨Vi∨Wi is satisfied. If f(Ui) = T or f(Vi) = T, then ci is satisfied.
So suppose that f(Ui) = f(Vi) = F. Then, since [[zi]] ⊆ [[yi]] ∪ [[yi]],
x ∈ [[ui]] ∩ [[vi]] ⊆ [[ri all yi]] ∩ [[ri all yi]] ⊆ [[ri all zi]] ⊆ [[wi]].
So x ∈ [[wi]], and f(wi) = T, and ci is satisfied.
Conversely, suppose f is a truth assignment such that c1 ∧ · · · ∧ ck is satisfied. By Lemma 4.1, it
suffices to build a nonempty model of Γ. Let M = {x}, and for each proposition letter P , set
[[p]] =
{
{x} if f(P ) = T
∅ if f(P ) = F
Note that again, if U is a literal with corresponding term u, we have x ∈ [[u]] if and only if f(U) = T.
Consider a clause ci = Ui ∨ Vi ∨Wi. We must define the interpretations of yi, zi, and ri, so that ψi1,
ψi2, and ψ
i
3 are satisfied for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
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Case 1: x ∈ [[wi]]. Set [[ri]] = {(x, x)}. The interpretations of yi and zi are irrelevant. Indeed, ψi1, ψ
i
2,
and ψi3 are satisfied, since [[ri all yi]] = [[ri all yi]] = [[wi]] =M .
Case 2: x /∈ [[wi]]. Set [[zi]] = {x} and [[ri]] = ∅. Then ψi3 is satisfied, since [[ri all zi]] = [[wi]] = ∅.
Since the clause ci = Ui ∨ Vi ∨Wi is satisfied, x must be in at least one of [[ui]] or [[vi]]. If it’s in both,
we’re done (and the interpretation of yi is irrelevant), since [[ui]] = [[vi]] = ∅. Otherwise, set
[[yi]] =
{
∅ if x /∈ [[ui]], x ∈ [[vi]]
{x} if x ∈ [[ui]], x /∈ [[vi]].
In the first case, M |= ψi1, since [[ri all yi]] = M , and M |= ψ
i
2, since [[vi]] = ∅. In the second case,
M |= ψi2, since [[ui]] = ∅, and M |= ψ
i
2, since [[ri all yi]] = M .
4.2 Completeness for the extended languages L+4 and L
+
4.5
We enlarge our syntax of L4.5 from sentences (all x y) and (some x y) to expressions of the form
[x1, . . . , xn] and 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 for n ≥ 1. Note that this is a departure from the languages we have
studied previously, since here we have infinitely many sentence formers, of arbitrary finite length. We
emphasize that [x1, . . . , xn] and 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 are sentences, not terms. The terms of L
+
4.5 are the same
as the terms of L4.5.
The semantics of this new language L+4.5 is:
M |= [x1, . . . , xn] iff
n⋂
i=1
[[xi]] = ∅
M |= 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 iff
n⋂
i=1
[[xi]] 6= ∅.
It is clear that 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 generalizes (some x y), since the latter sentence can be translated into
L+4.5 as 〈x, y〉. To see that [x1, . . . , xn] generalizes (all x y), note that
⋂n
i=1[[xi]] = ∅ if and only if for
some j (equivalently, for all j),
⋂
i6=j [[xi]] ⊆ [[xj ]]. So the sentence (all x y) can be translated into L
+
4.5 as
[x, y].
Our proof rules are shown in Figure 6. (ax) is a version of the axiom rule as we have seen it
throughout the paper. (res) is named for resolution. (But please note that the sentence [x1, . . . , xn]
is not interpreted disjunctively as in resolution.) The name (rel) stands for relational, since it is the
only rule of the system that mentions relations. We name (str) after structural rules of sequent calculi.
The side condition on this rule is that each xi appears in the list y1, . . . , yn. It implies the usual rules
of weakening, contraction, and exchange. (efq) and (raa) are our formulations of ex falso quodlibet
and reductio ad absurdum. In this system, [y1, . . . , yn] and 〈y1, . . . , yn〉 are contradictories. Given two
derivations with contradictory conclusions, one may use (efq) to put these two together and conclude
any sentence of the form [x1, . . . , xn]. Alternatively, one may use (raa) to withdraw all occurrences
of any one assumption of the form [x1, . . . , xn], and conclude the contradictory of that assumption,
〈x1, . . . , xn〉. Note the asymmetry between [x1, . . . , xn] and 〈x1, . . . , xn〉; this is arranged to as to allow
an easy proof-theoretic argument (Corollary 4.12) that (ax), (res), (rel), and (str) give a sound and
complete proof system for the smaller language L+4 , which only has sentences of the form [x1, . . . , xn].
Example 4.3. Here is how the translations of (barbara) and (some1) are derived in this system:
[x, y]
[y, x]
str
[y, z]
[x, z]
res
〈x, y〉
✟
✟✟❍
❍❍
[x, x]
[x, y]
str
〈x, x〉
raa
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[x, x]
ax
[x, y1, . . . , yn] [x, z1, . . . , zm]
[y1, . . . , yn, z1, . . . , zm]
res
[x1, x2, . . . , xn−1, xn]
[r all x1, r all x2, . . . , r all xn−1, r all xn]
rel
[x1, . . . , xm]
[y1, . . . , yn]
str
〈y1, . . . , ym〉 [y1, . . . , ym]
[x1, . . . , xn]
efq
✘✘
✘✘
✘❳❳❳❳❳
[x1, . . . , xn]....
〈y1, . . . , ym〉
✘✘
✘✘
✘❳❳❳❳❳
[x1, . . . , xn]....
[y1, . . . , ym]
〈x1, . . . , xn〉
raa
Figure 6: Rules of the logical system for L+4.5. The side condition on the structural rule (str) is that
each xi must be identical to some yj .
And here are (darii) and (anti):
〈x, y〉
✟
✟❍
❍[x, z]
[z, x]
str
[y, z]
[z, y]
str
[x, y]
res
〈x, z〉
raa
[x, y]
[y, x]
str
[r all y, r all x]
rel
Lemma 4.4 (Soundness). If Γ ⊢ ϕ, then Γ |= ϕ.
Proof. The soundness of (ax) and (str) are clear. For (res), (rel), and (efq), fix a model M.
For (res), assume that [[x]] ∩ (
⋂
i≤n[[yi]]) = ∅ and [[x]] ∩ (
⋂
j≤m[[zj ]]) = ∅. Suppose there is some
ℓ ∈ (
⋂
i≤n[[yi]]) ∩ (
⋂
j≤m[[zj ]]). Then either ℓ ∈ [[x]] or ℓ ∈ [[x]], which is a contradiction in either case.
For (rel), assume that (
⋂
i<n[[xi]]) ∩ [[xn]] = ∅, so
⋂
i<n[[xi]] ⊆ [[xn]]. Suppose there is some ℓ ∈
(
⋂
i<n[[r all xi]]) ∩ [[r all xn]]. Then there is some m ∈ [[xn]] such that it is not true that ℓ[[r]]m. For all
i < n, since ℓ ∈ [[r all xi]], m ∈ [[xi]]. But then m ∈ [[xn]], and this is a contradiction.
For (efq), it is vacuously true that if M |= 〈y1, . . . , ym〉 and M |= [y1, . . . , ym], then M |=
[x1, . . . , xn], since 〈y1, . . . , ym〉 and [y1, . . . , ym] are contradictory.
The soundness of (raa) is by induction on the number of instances of (raa) in the proof tree.
Assume that the last use of (raa) is at the root of the proof tree showing Γ ⊢ 〈x1, . . . , xn〉. Then
we have Γ ∪ {[x1, . . . , xn]} ⊢ 〈y1, . . . , ym〉 and Γ ∪ {[x1, . . . , xn]} ⊢ [y1, . . . , ym]. By induction, these
deductions are sound, so every model of Γ ∪ {[x1, . . . , xn]} satisfies both 〈y1, . . . , ym〉 and [y1, . . . , ym].
But these sentences are contradictory, so Γ ∪ {[x1, . . . , xn]} has no models. In other words, every model
of Γ satisfies 〈x1, . . . , xn〉, as was to be shown.
Definition 4.5. Let Γ be a theory, and let SS be a set of terms.
1. Γ is inconsistent if it proves both [x1, . . . , xn] and 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 for some list of terms x1, . . . , xn.
Otherwise, Γ is consistent.
2. SS is Γ-inconsistent if there is a list of terms x1, . . . , xn from SS such that Γ ⊢ [x1, . . . , xn].
Otherwise, SS is Γ-consistent.
Lemma 4.6. Let SS be Γ-consistent. Then for all x, either SS ∪ {x} or SS ∪ {x} is Γ-consistent.
Proof. Suppose not. Then by (str), there are y1, . . . , yn ∈ SS such that Γ ⊢ [x, y1, . . . , yn], and there
are z1, . . . , zm ∈ SS such that Γ ⊢ [x, z1, . . . , zm]. By (res), Γ ⊢ [y1, . . . , yn, z1, . . . , zm]. This contradicts
the Γ-consistency of SS.
31
Lemma 4.7. Let SS be a maximal Γ-consistent set of terms. Then for all x, exactly one of x or x
belongs to SS.
Proof. By Lemma 4.6 and maximality, either x or x belongs to SS. Both cannot belong to SS, since
this would contradict Γ-consistency, due to (ax).
Lemma 4.8. Let SS be maximal Γ-consistent, and suppose that (r all x) /∈ SS. Then there is some
maximal Γ-consistent T such that x ∈ T ; and whenever (r all y) ∈ SS, we have y ∈ T .
Proof. Let T0 = {x} ∪ {y : (r all y) ∈ SS}. If T0 is Γ-inconsistent, then by (str) there are y1, . . . , yn
such that (r all yi) ∈ SS for all i and Γ ⊢ [y1, . . . , yn, x]. By (rel),
Γ ⊢ [r all y1, . . . , r all yn, r all x].
Since SS contains each term (r all yi), by Γ-consistency it does not contain (r all x). So by Lemma 4.7,
Γ contains (r all x). This is a contradiction.
So T0 is Γ-consistent. By Zorn’s Lemma, T0 has a maximal Γ-consistent extension, say T .
The canonical model of Γ Let M be the set of all maximal Γ-consistent sets of terms. We define a
model M(Γ) with domain M by defining:
SS ∈ [[p]] iff p ∈ SS
SS[[r]]T iff for some z ∈ T , (r all z) ∈ SS.
Lemma 4.9 (Truth Lemma). In M(Γ), for any term x, [[x]] = {SS ∈M : x ∈ SS}.
Proof. By induction on x. When x is a noun, this is by the definition of the model.
Induction step for (r all x): Suppose (r all x) ∈ SS, and suppose T ∈ [[x]]. By induction x ∈ T , so
by the definition of the model, SS[[r]]T . Thus SS ∈ [[r all x]]. Conversely, suppose SS ∈ [[r all x]], and
assume for contradiction that (r all x) /∈ SS. By Lemma 4.8, there is some T ∈ M such that x ∈ T ,
and whenever (r all y) ∈ SS, we have y ∈ T , so y /∈ T by Lemma 4.7. By induction, T ∈ [[x]], but it is
not the case that SS[[r]]T , which is a contradiction.
Induction step for x: For any SS ∈M , we have SS ∈ [[x]] if and only if SS /∈ [[x]]. By induction, this
is equivalent to x /∈ SS. And by Lemma 4.7, x /∈ SS if and only if x ∈ SS.
Lemma 4.10. If Γ is consistent, then M(Γ) |= Γ.
Proof. Let ϕ ∈ Γ. First, suppose ϕ = [x1, . . . , xn]. Suppose for contradiction that there exists SS ∈⋂
i[[xi]]. Then by the Truth Lemma, xi ∈ SS for all i, contradicting Γ-consistency of SS.
Now suppose ϕ = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉. We claim that the set {x1, . . . , xn} is Γ-consistent. If not, then using
(str), Γ ⊢ [x1, . . . , xn]. So Γ is inconsistent, contradicting our assumption.
Since {x1, . . . , xn} is Γ-consistent, we can extend it to a maximal Γ-consistent set SS, and by the
Truth Lemma, SS ∈
⋂n
i=1[[xi]].
Theorem 4.11 (Completeness). For any sentence ϕ, if Γ |= ϕ, then Γ ⊢ ϕ.
Proof. Suppose ϕ = [x1, . . . , xn]. If Γ is inconsistent, then by (efq), Γ ⊢ ϕ, and we are done. So we
may assume that Γ is consistent. Assume for contradiction that Γ 6⊢ [x1, . . . , xn]. Consider the canonical
modelM(Γ). By Lemma 4.10,M(Γ) |= Γ, soM(Γ) |= ϕ. By (str), the set {x1, . . . , xn} is Γ-consistent.
So we can extend it to a maximal Γ-consistent set SS. By the Truth Lemma, SS ∈
⋂n
i=1[[xi]], so in
M(Γ) 6|= [x1, . . . , xn], which is a contradiction.
Now suppose ϕ = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉. If Γ |= ϕ, then Γ ∪ {[x1, . . . , xn]} has no models, so by Lemma 4.10,
Γ ∪ {[x1, . . . , xn]} is inconsistent. This means that Γ ∪ {[x1, . . . , xn]} proves both 〈y1, . . . , ym〉 and
[y1, . . . , ym], so by (raa), Γ ⊢ 〈x1, . . . , xn〉, as was to be shown.
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We have just seen the completeness theorem for L+4.5. Let L
+
4 be the generalization of L4 obtained
by adding sentences of the form [x1, . . . , xn] (but not 〈x1, . . . , xn〉). Then we can restrict our logical
system for L+4.5 to all the rules except for (efq) and (raa). These rules are still sound for L
+
4 , and we
will show that they are complete as well.
Corollary 4.12. Let ⊢0 be the proof system consisting of the rules (ax), (str), (res), and (rel). Then
⊢0 is sound and complete for L
+
4 .
Proof. We have already observed the soundness. So suppose Γ is a theory in L+4 and ϕ is a sentence in
L+4 such that Γ |= ϕ. Moving up to the larger language L
+
4.5, we have Γ ⊢ ϕ by Theorem 4.11. Our goal
is to show that Γ ⊢0 ϕ.
We first claim that if Γ is any theory in L+4 and ψ is any sentence in L
+
4.5 such that Γ ⊢ ψ, then
(raa) is not used in the proof. The argument is by induction on height of the proof tree. Suppose for
contradiction that (raa) is used. We may assume that the root of the proof tree is an application of
(raa):
✘✘
✘✘
✘❳❳❳❳❳
[x1, . . . , xn]....
〈y1, . . . , ym〉
✘✘
✘✘
✘❳❳❳❳❳
[x1, . . . , xn]....
[y1, . . . , ym]
〈x1, . . . , xn〉
raa
The left subtree is a proof of 〈y1, . . . , ym〉 from Γ∪ {[x1, . . . , xn]}. Since Γ∪ {[x1, . . . , xn]} is a theory in
L+4 , by induction (raa) is not used in this proof. But none of the other rules produce consequences of
the form 〈y1, . . . , ym〉, so this is a contradiction.
Now it is easy to see that if Γ is any theory in L+4 , then no ⊢ proof from Γ uses (efq), since none of
our rules other than (raa) allow us to produce or introduce a premise of the form 〈y1, . . . , ym〉.
Therefore, if Γ ⊢ ϕ, then Γ ⊢0 ϕ.
4.3 Open problems concerning L4 and L4.5
We began this section with the result that the consequence relation for L4 is Co-NPTime hard. This
implies that, assuming P 6= NP, there is no boundedly complete syllogistic proof system for either L4
or L4.5 Instead, we added to the syntax and formulated a proof system which went beyond the “purely
syllogistic”; in that it used schematic rules and also (raa). But we did not find proof systems of any kind
for the original languages L4 and L4.5. We leave this as an open problem. (There is a result of possible
relevance in [5]: a syllogistic system for sentences of the form (all p x), where p is a (complemented)
noun, and x is either a (complemented) noun or a term (r all q), where q is a (complemented) noun.) For
that matter, we also leave open the question of determining the exact complexities of the consequence
relations for L4 and L4.5.
5 L5 and L5.5: Putting it all together
The largest logics in this paper are L5 and L5.5, as described in Figure 1. We have much less to say about
them than about their sub-languages because a notational variant of L5.5 has already been studied. This
is the language R∗† in [10]. Here is the syntax of this language. We begin with a set N of nouns a set
V of verb atoms. A verb literal is either a verb r or its complement r. We define terms and sentences
via the syntax below:
terms x, y, . . . p ∈ N | p | r all p | r all p | r some p | r some p
sentences ϕ, ψ, . . . all x y | some x y
Note that we do not have recursion for terms. In the semantics, we interpret complemented verbs using
relational complement:
[[r]] = (M ×M) \ [[r]].
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The rest of the semantics is clear.
Proposition 5.1. There is a translation map ϕ 7→ ϕ∗ of sentences in R∗† to sentences in L5.5 with the
following properties:
1. Γ |= ϕ iff Γ∗ |= ϕ∗, where Γ∗ = {ψ∗ : ψ ∈ Γ}.
2. ϕ 7→ ϕ∗ is computable in PTime.
Proof. It is sufficient to translate terms x of R∗†. For this, we use
(r all x)∗ = r some x
(r some x)∗ = r all x
The point is that the left sides of the equations above have the same interpretations as the right side in
every model.
The translation in the other direction is more complicated due to the complex terms in the languages
of this paper. We use the standard technique of flattening.
Proposition 5.2. There is a translation map (Γ, ϕ) 7→ (Γ∗, ϕ∗) from assertions in L5.5 to assertions in
R∗† with the following properties:
1. Γ |= ϕ iff Γ∗ |= ϕ∗.
2. If Γ is finite, so is Γ∗. In this case, (Γ, ϕ) 7→ (Γ∗, ϕ∗) is computable in PTime.
Proof. Fix Γ and ϕ in L5.5. Let T be the set of all terms in Γ∪{ϕ}, including subterms. For each t ∈ T,
let xt be a new noun. Let ∆1 be the set of all sentences of R∗† below, for x ∈ T:
all xp p all p xp
all x
(r all t) (r all xt) all (r all xt) x(r all t)
all x(r some t) (r some xt) all (r some xt) x(r some t)
all xp p all p xp
all x
r all t
(r some xt) all (r some xt) xr all t
all xr some t (r all xt) all (r all xt) xr some t
all x
t
xt all xt xt
An easy induction shows that for all t ∈ T, and all models M |= ∆1, [[xt]] = [[t]]. We translate the
sentences of L5.5 to those of R∗† (with the new nouns) in the obvious way: (all t u)∗ = all xt xu, and
(some t u)∗ = some xt xu. Let ∆2 = {ψ∗ : ψ ∈ Γ}. Finally, we take Γ∗ to be ∆1 ∪∆2, and ϕ∗ to be the
translation that we just saw.
We check point (1): Γ |= ϕ iff Γ∗ |= ϕ∗. Assume that Γ |= ϕ, and let M |= Γ∗. Due to ∆1, we have
our key fact: for all relevant terms t, [[t]] = [[xt]]. Using this and the fact that M |= ∆2, it follows that
M |= Γ. And so M |= ϕ. But then using our key fact again, M |= ϕ∗. The converse is similar.
As shown in [10], the consequence relation for R∗† is ExpTime complete. Moreover, there are no
proof systems which are finite, sound, and complete for the logic, even allowing reductio ad absurdum.
(Nevertheless, there are logical systems for R∗†. For example, Fitch-style system may be found in [4, 6].
That system uses individual variables, as in first-order logic, but in a controlled way.)
It follows from the translations in Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 that the consequence relation for L5.5 is
ExpTime complete. Moreover, there can be no sound and complete syllogistic proof system for L5.5,
even allowing all of the (cases) rules in this paper. Indeed, any rule allowing proof by cases would
correspond to a rule in the language of R∗† which is derivable from reductio ad absurdum.
We would like to point out that the ExpTime hardness result for L5.5 extends to the weaker logic L5.
To see this, we must recall the outline of the argument in [10]. The starting point is Spaan’s theorem [12]
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that the satisfiability problem for LU , modal logic with the universal modality, is ExpTime hard. One
takes a sentence ϕ in LU and translates it to a finite set Sϕ of sentences of R∗† with the property that
ϕ and Sϕ are equisatisfiable. By our translation, Sϕ may be taken to be a set of sentences in L5.5. By
examining the details, Sϕ is a set S
∗
ϕ of sentences in L5, together with one additional sentence of the
form (some x x). The upshot is that ϕ is unsatisfiable iff S∗ϕ |= all x x. Note that (all x x) is a sentence
in L5. In this way, the consequence relation for L5 is at least as hard as the (un)satisfiability problem
for LU .
This paper also explored extensions of syllogistic logic using schemes like (chains). It is possible
that there is a schematic extension of L5.5, and it is also possible that extensions to the syntax will help.
We have not explored this. The logical system for R∗† which uses individual variables adapts to L5.5
in a straightforward way, and we expect that the completeness and finite model properties which were
shown in [4] hold in the adapted system.
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